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1. Background 
Following concerns in the late 1990s about the low level of the stock biomass and the 
possibility of recruitment failure a range of technical measures were introduced (Council 
Regulations N°1162/2001, 2602/2001 and 494/2002) aimed at improving the selection pattern 
and protecting juveniles. Subsequently a recovery plan was introduced (Council regulation EC 
Reg. No 811/2004). 
The technical measures comprise a 100 mm minimum mesh size for otter-trawlers when Hake 
comprises more than 20% of the total amount of marine organisms retained onboard, with a 
dispensation for those vessels less than 12 m in length and which return to port within 24 
hours of their most recent departure. Further, two areas have been defined, one in Sub area 
VII and the other in Sub area VIII, where a 100 mm minimum mesh size is required for all 
otter-trawlers, irrespective of the proportion of Hake caught. 
The recovery plan consists of setting a TAC equivalent to a target F of 0.25 (Fpa), or a lower F 
to prevent decline in SSB, and with the constraint that annual change in TAC should not 
exceed 15%. 
Since the end of 2005, the French vessels involved in the Nephrops fishery in the Bay of 
Biscay are regulated by licence. This licence is given only for vessels using a square mesh 
panel allowing 20-30% escapement of undersized Hake. 
In order to advise the Commission on the potential impact of the proposed management plan 
for Northern hake, an Expert Working Group (STECF/SGBRE-07-03) was convened from 
18-22 June 2007 to evaluate the potential biological consequences of the plan. STECF has 
already commented on the findings of that Group (5-9 November 2007, STECF/PLEN-07-
03). A second Expert group (STECF/SGBRE-07-05) was then convened in Brussels from 3 - 
6 December 2007 with the following Terms of Reference: 
 
Terms of Reference 
The general objective of the tasks to be carried out is to produce a solid analysis of the 
socioeconomic impact of the different management scenarios, implying an evaluation of the 
potential economic performance for the EU fleets involved in the fishery comparing the 
different management scenarios, with the following terms of reference. 
 1. For each Member State, what is the economic and social baseline situation for the 
fishing fleets, onshore industries and communities that depend on fisheries for Hake 
(e.g. size, turnover, employment in 2005)? 
2. What is the baseline situation in biological and environmental terms of the fishery 
(state of the stocks concerned, discards, impact on wider marine environment, etc)? 
3. Given expected stock recoveries under the long term proposal, for each Member State, 
what economic impacts (e.g. costs, revenues) can be expected during: 
a. the first 1-3 years,  
b. after 5, 10 and 15 years, 
compared with continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change”), in the 
catching sector and onshore sector? 
4. Given expected stock recoveries under the long term proposal, for each Member State, 
what social impacts (e.g. employment) can be expected during: 
a. the first 1-3 years,  
b. after 5, 10 and 15 years, 
compared with continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change”), in the 
catching sector and onshore sector? 
5. Given expected stock recoveries under the long term proposal, what biological and 
environmental impacts (e.g. sea bed, other species) can be expected during: 
a. the first 1-3 years,  
b. after 5, 10 and 15 years, 
compared with continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change”)? 
6. As a robustness test (taking into consideration the various sources of uncertainty), 
assess the economic, social, biological and environmental consequences of plausible 
alternative exploitation patterns that might arise due to the implementation of 
management measures. 
Identify any needs for long term data collection from the sector in support of future impact 
assessments or for monitoring purpose. 
 
2. Approach of the Expert Group 
In undertaking the impact assessment, the Expert Working Group (STECF/SGBRE 07-05) 
considered two main scenarios: 
- A “no policy change” scenario based on the current fishing mortality; also referred to 
as the status quo scenario (Fsq); it implies fishing at the level of  Fpa. Hereafter referred 
to as Fpa scenario. 
- A scenario which assumes a reduction in fishing mortality (F) from the current level to 
Fmax, which is used as a proxy for the target reference point Fmsy. The scenario 
assumes annual reductions in F of 5%, 10% or 15%. Hereafter referred to as the Fmax 
scenario. 
In addition, taking into account the findings from the STECF/SGBRE-07-03 report, that the 
outcome of the management plan is influenced by the assumptions on the level of discarding, 
the two main scenarios were undertaken with and without including estimates of discarding.  
 
  
 
 
3. STECF observations and conclusions 
The report of the STECF/SGBRE Expert group on the impact assessment of the long-term 
management plan for Northern hake is attached at ANNEX I. STECF reviewed the report by 
Correspondence in December 2007 and January 2008 and endorses the findings of the Expert 
Group and draws the following main conclusions: 
1. The predicted impact of the management plan is heavily influenced by the 
assumptions regarding discards. However, the available data on discards are not 
considered very reliable; discard rates of several fleets are simply not known and when 
data are available, it is not possible to incorporate them in a consistent way. The 
evaluations undertaken including discards therefore illustrate the sensitivity of the 
predicted outcome to the assumptions about discarding practices. 
2. Comparing the results of the Fpa and Fmax scenarios without taking discards into 
consideration indicates that over the period analysed there the predicted outcomes are 
essentially the same.  
3. Comparing the results of the Fpa and Fmax scenarios while taking estimates of discards 
into consideration, indicates that the short term losses (in terms of landings and 
revenues) under the Fmax scenario are higher than continuing to fish at Fpa.  However in 
the long run, the benefits of reducing F to Fmax are much higher and continue to be 
higher than continuing to fish at Fpa .  
4. The precise effect of the different scenarios in terms of costs and benefits between the 
different fleet segments depends on the relative share of Hake catches in terms of total 
revenue. As the present analysis does not take into account differences in exploitation 
patterns between fleets, the model is unable to account for any effect on fleets of the 
size composition of hake catches. The potential redistribution of catches and hence 
Gross Value Added between fishing fleets and segments is variable.  
5. Whereas the EIAA model used did not account for price changes resulting from 
changes in landings, based on the general characteristics of fish markets (ceteris 
paribus) large increases in landings may cause only relatively small falls in price and 
the total revenues of the fleets will increase as landings rise. 
6. Qualitatively, it is possible to conclude that the impacts on the fleets will be magnified 
on shore in the processing industry. Noting however the low degree of processing 
taking pace in the Hake marketing chain this knock-on effect is expected to be of 
relatively minor importance 
7. Indirect change in selection pattern could result as a consequence of changes in the 
fleet structure because the selection patterns for each fleet segment may be different. 
In the runs of the EIAA model any such change has not been accounted for. However, 
an attempt has been made using different selectivity patterns by gears to simulate 
restructuring of the fleet.  
8. The simulations showed that improving the exploitation pattern by reducing catches of 
smaller sized Hake could lead to better long-term yields. Without such an 
improvement in exploitation pattern, the overall reduction in F required to achieve the 
same long-term economic benefits would be much greater.  
9. STECF is of the opinion that a change in the age and size structure of the stock is 
unlikely to have any noticeable socio-economic impacts e.g. on employment. 
 
  
STECF/SGBRE-07-05 WORKING GROUP REPORT ON 
NORTHERN HAKE LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT PLAN IMPACT ASSESSMENT   
Brussels, 3-6 December 2007 
 
This report does not necessarily reflect the view of the European Commission and in no way 
anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Northern Hake long-term management plans 
A working group met in Brussels December 3-6 2007 to perform an impact assessment of the 
proposed management plan for Northern Hake. The working group consisted of biologists and 
economists. This report represents the economical analysis of the biological evaluation as 
represented in the SGBRE-07-03 report of a proposed long term management plan for  
Northern Hake.  
Following concerns in the late 1990s about the low level of the stock biomass and the 
possibility of recruitment failure a range of technical measures were introduced (Council 
Regulations N°1162/2001, 2602/2001 and 494/2002) aimed at improving the selection pattern 
and protecting juveniles. Subsequently a recovery plan was introduced (Council regulation EC 
Reg. No 811/2004). 
The technical measures comprise a 100 mm minimum mesh size for otter-trawlers when Hake 
comprises more than 20% of the total amount of marine organisms retained onboard, with a 
dispensation for those vessels less than 12 m in length and which return to port within 24 
hours of their most recent departure. Further, two areas have been defined, one in Sub area 
VII and the other in Sub area VIII, where a 100 mm minimum mesh size is required for all 
otter-trawlers, irrespective of the proportion of Hake caught. 
The recovery plan consists of setting a TAC equivalent to a target F of 0.25 (Fpa), or a lower F 
to prevent decline in SSB, and with the constraint that annual change in TAC should not 
exceed 15%. 
Since the end of 2005, the French vessels involved in the Nephrops fishery in the Bay of 
Biscay are regulated by licence. This licence is given only for vessels using a square mesh 
panel allowing 20-30% escapement of undersized Hake. 
  
 
2 TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The general objective of the tasks to be carried out is to produce a solid analysis of the 
socioeconomic impact of the different management scenarios, implying an evaluation of the 
potential economic performance for the EU fleets involved in the fishery comparing the 
different management scenarios, with the following terms of reference. 
2. For each Member State, what is the economic and social baseline situation for the fishing 
fleets, onshore industries and communities that depend on fisheries for Hake (e.g. size, 
turnover, employment in 2005)? 
3. What is the baseline situation in biological and environmental terms of the fishery (state of 
the stocks concerned, discards, impact on wider marine environment, etc)? 
4. Given expected stock recoveries under the long term proposal, for each Member State, 
what economic impacts (e.g. costs, revenues) can be expected during: 
a. the first 1-3 years,  
b. after 5, 10 and 15 years, 
compared with continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change”), in the 
catching sector and onshore sector? 
5. Given expected stock recoveries under the long term proposal, for each Member State, 
what social impacts (e.g. employment) can be expected during: 
a. the first 1-3 years,  
b. after 5, 10 and 15 years, 
compared with continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change”), in the 
catching sector and onshore sector? 
6. Given expected stock recoveries under the long term proposal, what biological and 
environmental impacts (e.g. sea bed, other species) can be expected during: 
a. the first 1-3 years,  
b. after 5, 10 and 15 years, 
compared with continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change”)? 
7. As a robustness test (taking into consideration the various sources of uncertainty), 
assess the economic, social, biological and environmental consequences of plausible 
alternative exploitation patterns that might arise due to the implementation of 
management measures. 
8. Identify any needs for long term data collection from the sector in support of future impact 
assessments or for monitoring purpose 
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3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Concerning the assessment of the impact of the Long Term Management plan for Northern 
Hake the main conclusions are: 
- The Impact Assessment has been considering two main sets of scenarios: 
o A “no policy change” scenario based on the current fishing mortality; also 
referred to as the status quo scenario (Fsq); it implies fishing at the level of  Fpa. 
Hereafter referred to as Fpa scenario 
o Reducing the current fishing mortality to Fmax, being a good proxy for the 
target reference point Fmsy, in steps of an annual reduction of F with  5%, 10% 
or 15%. Hereafter referred to as Fmax scenario 
- In commenting on the work of SGBRE-07-03 (analysing the biological assessment of 
the long term Northern Hake management plan) STECF noted the following:  
o there is little difference, in terms of long-term yields, between Fmax and Fpa/Fsq 
scenarios. STECF noted however that reducing F to Fmsy as opposed to Fpa 
would lead to higher SSB and thus give the stock more stability, reducing the 
risk of getting back to an unsafe situation. This could also improve economic 
efficiency. 
o inclusion of discard estimates in the analysis creates a stronger positive effect 
on yield and SSB when F is reduced. Furthermore, inclusion of discards in 
simulations where the selection pattern is changed to reduce F on younger ages 
produces positive benefits of similar magnitude to reductions in overall F. 
These analyses are based on preliminary and incomplete estimates of discards 
quantities, nevertheless, STECF is aware that discarding takes place and 
considered, therefore, that the output gives a better representation than when 
discards are excluded. STECF recommended that in any management plan 
involving a move towards an Fmax target, measures which improve the 
selection pattern should be included.  
- The outcome of the Impact Assessment is affected by the discards. However, the data 
on discards are not considered very reliable; discard rates of several fleets are simply 
not known and when data are available, it is not possible to incorporate them in a 
consistent way. Taking the STECF observation on the SGBRE-07-03 report into 
consideration however, two sets of analysis have been implemented: with and without 
taking discards into consideration. 
- Analysing the Fpa and Fmax scenarios without taking discards into consideration results 
in a situation wherein over the period analysed hardly significant differences between 
the scenarios exist.  
- If the two scenarios are compared while taking discards into consideration the short 
term losses (in terms of landings and revenues) under the Fmax scenario are higher, 
however in the long run the benefits of the Fmax scenario are much higher and continue 
to be higher.  
- The precise effect of the different scenarios in terms of costs and benefits between the 
different fleet segments depends on the relative share of Hake catches in total revenue. 
As this analysis does not account for differences in exploitation patterns between 
fleets, the model does not account for the effect of different scenarios on fleets 
catching different sized Hake. The potential redistribution of catches and hence Gross 
Value Added between fishing fleets and segments is variable.  
  
- Whereas the EIAA model used did not account for price changes resulting from 
changes in landings, based on the general characteristics of fish markets (ceteris 
paribus) large increases in landings may cause only relatively small falls in price and 
the total revenues of the fleets will increase as landings rise. 
- Qualitatively, it is possible to conclude that the impacts on the fleets will be magnified 
on shore by the multiplier process but that the employment and output multipliers will 
be low.   
- Indirect change in selection pattern could be expected as a consequence of changes in 
the fleet structure, each fleet segment having different selection patterns. In the runs of 
the EIAA model this change has not been included. However, an attempt has been 
made using different selectivity patterns by gears to simulate restructuring of the fleet.  
- The simulations showed that changing the exploitation pattern by reducing catches of 
smaller sized Hake could lead to better long-term yields while the reduction in overall 
effort would be smaller. Reducing catches of smaller sized Hake would imply a lesser 
overall reduction of F yet obtaining full economic benefits.  
- It is not thought likely that a change in the age and size structure of the stock will have 
socio-economic impacts like i.a. employment. 
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4 BASELINE SITUATION OF THE FISHERY IN BIOLOGICAL TERMS  
4.1 Description of the fishery 
Northern Hake is taken as part of catches in mixed demersal fisheries. Historically, a set of 
different Fishery Units (FU) was defined by the ICES Working Group on Fisheries Units in 
Sub-areas VII and VIII in 1985, in order to study the fishing activity related to demersal 
species (ICES, 1991). To take into account the Hake catches from other areas, a new Fishery 
Unit was introduced in the beginning of the nineties (FU 16: Outsiders). This Fishery Unit 
was created on the basis of combination between mixed areas and mixed gears (trawl, seine, 
long line, and gill net). The FU have been defined as follows: 
Table 4.1.1: Fishery Units in Northern Hake Fisheries  
Fishery Unit Description Sub-area 
FU1 Long-line in medium to deep water VII 
FU2 Long-line in shallow water VII 
FU3 Gill nets VII 
FU4 Non-Nephrops trawling in medium to deep water VII 
FU5 Non-Nephrops trawling in shallow water VII 
FU6 Beam trawling in shallow water VII 
FU8 Nephrops trawling in medium to deep water VII 
FU9 Nephrops trawling in shallow to medium water VIII 
FU10 Trawling in shallow to medium water VIII 
FU12 Long-line in medium to deep water VIII 
FU13 Gill nets in shallow to medium water VIII 
FU14 Trawling in medium to deep water VIII 
FU15 Miscellaneous VII & VIII 
FU16 Outsiders IIIa, IV, V & VI 
FU00 French unknown  
The main part of the fishery (close to 90% of the total landings) is currently conducted by six 
Fishery Units, three  operating in Sub-area VII: FU 1 (Long-line in medium to deep water in 
Sub-area VII), FU 3 (Gill nets in Sub-area VII) and FU 4 (Non-Nephrops trawling in medium 
to deep water in Sub-area VII), two in Sub-area VIII: FU 13 (Gill nets in shallow to medium 
water) and FU 14 (Trawling in medium to deep water in Sub-area VIII) and one in Sub-areas 
IIIa, IV, V and VI, representing respectively 22%, 13%, 20%, 8%, 13% and 15% of total 
landings  in 2006. 
Spain accounts for the main part of the landings with 59% of the total in 2006. France is 
taking 26% of the total, UK 6%, Denmark 3%, Ireland 3% and other countries (Norway, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden) contributing small amounts. 
Total landings from the Northern stock of Hake by area for the period 1961-2006 as used by 
the WG are given in Table 4.1.2. They include landings from Divisions IIIa and IVa,c, Sub-
  
areas IV, VI and VII, and Divisions VIIIa,b,d, as reported to ICES. Except in 1995, landings 
decreased steadily from 66 500 t in 1989 to 35 000 t in 1998. Up to 2003, landings have 
fluctuated around 40 000 t. In 2004 and 2005, an important increase in landings had been 
observed with 47 123 t and 46 300 t of Hake landed respectively. In 2006, the total landings 
decreased to 41,810 t. 
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Table 4.1.2: Estimates of catches ('000 t) for Northern Hake by area for 1961–2006. 
 Landings (1) Discards (2) Catches (3) 
Year    IVa+VI     VII   VIIIa,b Unallocated    Total VIIIa,b Total 
1961 - - - 95.6 95.6 - 95.6 
1962 - - - 86.3 86.3 - 86.3 
1963 - - - 86.2 86.2 - 86.2 
1964 - - - 76.8 76.8 - 76.8 
1965 - - - 64.7 64.7 - 64.7 
1966 - - - 60.9 60.9 - 60.9 
1967 - - - 62.1 62.1 - 62.1 
1968 - - - 62.0 62.0 - 62.0 
1969 - - - 54.9 54.9 - 54.9 
1970 - - - 64.9 64.9 - 64.9 
1971 8.5 19.4 23.4 0 51.3 - 51.3 
1972 9.4 14.9 41.2 0 65.5 - 65.5 
1973 9.5 31.2 37.6 0 78.3 - 78.3 
1974 9.7 28.9 34.5 0 73.1 - 73.1 
1975 11.0 29.2 32.5 0 72.7 - 72.7 
1976 12.9 26.7 28.5 0 68.1 - 68.1 
1977 8.5 21.0 24.7 0 54.2 - 54.2 
1978 8.0 20.3 24.5 -2.2 50.6 2.4 52.9 
1979 8.7 17.6 27.2 -2.4 51.1 2.7 53.8 
1980 9.7 22.0 28.4 -2.8 57.3 3.2 60.5 
1981 8.8 25.6 22.3 -2.8 53.9 2.3 56.3 
1982 5.9 25.2 26.2 -2.3 55.0 3.1 58.1 
1983 6.2 26.3 27.1 -2.1 57.5 2.6 60.1 
1984 9.5 33.0 22.9 -2.1 63.3 1.9 65.1 
1985 9.2 27.5 21.0 -1.6 56.1 3.8 59.9 
1986 7.3 27.4 23.9 -1.5 57.1 3.0 60.1 
1987 7.8 32.9 24.7 -2.0 63.4 2.0 65.3 
1988 8.8 30.9 26.6 -1.5 64.8 2.0 66.8 
1989 7.4 26.9 32.0 0.2 66.5 2.3 68.8 
  
 Landings (1) Discards (2) Catches (3) 
Year    IVa+VI     VII   VIIIa,b Unallocated    Total VIIIa,b Total 
1990 6.7 23.0 34.4 -4.2 59.9 1.5 61.4 
1991 8.3 21.5 31.6 -3.9 57.6 1.7 59.3 
1992 8.6 22.5 23.5 2.1 56.6 1.7 58.3 
1993 8.5 20.5 19.8 3.3 52.1 1.5 53.6 
1994 5.4 21.1 24.7 0 51.3 1.9 53.1 
1995 5.3 24.1 28.1 0 57.6 1.2 58.9 
1996 4.4 24.7 18.0 0 47.2 1.5 48.8 
1997 3.3 18.9 20.3 0 42.6 1.8 44.4 
1998 3.2 18.7 13.1 0 35.0 0.8 35.8 
1999 4.3 24.0 11.6 0 39.8 0.8 40.6 
2000 4.0 26.0 12.0 0 42.0 0.6 42.6 
2001 4.4 23.1 9.2 0 36.7 0.5 37.2 
2002 2.9 21.1 15.9 0 40.1 0.3 40.4 
 2003 2.8  23.7 15.3  0  41.9  -  41.9  
2004 4.4 27.2 15.5 0 47.1 - 47.1 
2005 5.3 26.7 14.4 0 46.4 - 46.4 
2006 6.1 24.9 10.8 0 41.8 - 41.8 
(1) Spanish data for 1961–1972 not revised, data for Sub area VIII for 1973–1978 include data for  
      Divisions VIIIa,b only. Data for 1979–1981 are revised based on French surveillance data.  
      Includes Divisions IIIa, IVb,c from 1976.     
     There are some unallocated landings moreover for the period 1961–1970.   
(2) Discards have been estimated from 1978 and only for Divisions VIIII a,b.    
(3) From 1978 total catches used for the Working Group.     
4.2 Discards 
Information available suggests that the discards rate could be high (up to 95% for age 0) in 
some years, areas and for some fleets. Some improvement in discard data availability (number 
of fleets sampled and area coverage) has been observed in recent years. However, sampling 
does not cover all fleets contributing to Hake catches, discard rates of several fleets are simply 
not known and when data are available, it is not possible to incorporate them in a consistent 
way.  
4.3 The assessment 
The XSA assessment of this stock is based on estimates of landings at age and trends in 
abundance given by commercial CPUE data and four series of French, UK and Spanish trawl 
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survey data. As said above, data on discards are presently inadequate for inclusion in the 
assessment. Due to low confidence in the estimate of age 0 in the landings because of 
inconsistencies in the data for this age group in recent years, age 0 was removed from the 
catch at age matrix (replaced with 0 landings) and from the commercial fleet data. However, 
age 0 is still used in the assessment because indices for age 0 are available from surveys in 
age 0. 
There are several sources of uncertainties for this stock: 
- CPUE indices on the earlier year of the series.  
- Non validated ageing criteria. 
- Substantial uncertainty associated with total catches, particularly on small ages. 
- Estimation of recruitment in recent years due mainly to inconsistencies in younger age 
indices from the FR-EVHOES survey. As this survey is thought to provide a reliable 
age 0 index, this may reveal an ageing problem  
Alternative runs conducted by the ICES working group in 2006 (ICES, 2006) indicated that 
results are very sensitive to each of these uncertainties. 
The assessment summary (ICES, 2007) is presented in Figure 4.3.1. SSB appears to have been 
very close to Bpa over the last 3 years, and F has been around Fpa since 2001. The increase in 
SSB since the low values estimated in the 90s appears to be due to a combination of good 
recruitment and moderate fishing mortality. As the growth rate and thus the age determination 
and productivity of Northern Hake stocks are uncertain, absolute estimates of SSB and F have 
to be considered with caution. 
 
Figure 4.3.1: Summary plots for Northern Hake stock as obtained from the XSA assessment. 
FISHING MORTALITY
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Year
RECRUITMENT (AT AGE 0)
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
400.0
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Year
SPAWNING STOCK BIOMASS (SSB)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Year
 LANDINGS
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Year
 
  
 
5 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LISBON MEETING (SGBRE-07-03) 
The European Commission has asked STECF to provided scientific advice regarding several 
possible scenarios to be considered in the future long-term management plan. The analysis 
conducted by SGBRE-07-03 during the Lisbon meeting included both single-species 
management and multi-species management considerations.  
5.1 SGBRE-07-03 Assumptions 
The stock-recruitment relationship is not well estimated for the northern stock of Hake and the 
group decided to use an Ochkam model. Using the Ockham model in favour of other S-R gave 
a more conservative perspective of the stock development.  
The current assessment for Northern Hake is conducted without accounting for discards as 
discards rates of several fleets are simply not known and even where data are available, it is 
not possible to incorporate them in a consistent way. The Group considered that in aiming for 
an optimum long-term management of this stock the issue of discards should not be ignored. 
Hence, simulations based on an ad-hoc rebuilding of historical discards were also carried out. 
In these simulations, two scenarios of improvement in the selection pattern were also tested. 
Figure 5.1.1: Example exploitation patterns.  
exploitation pattern
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Age
%
 re
ta
in
ed
H1
H2
 
For illustrative purposes, two different exploitation patterns have been assumed: 
- H1: assumed than 90% of Hake at age 0 are spared, 50% at age 1 and 10% at age 2. 
- H2: assumed no catch at age 0 and 1, 10% at age 2, 50% at age 3 and 90% at age 4, 
compared to the current one. 
5.2 Main findings of SGBRE-07-03 
Fmax (0.17) is well defined for this stock and was considered a good proxy for the target 
reference point Fmsy. 
Decreasing F to Fmax will result in a higher and more stable biomass and higher catch per unit 
effort compared to fishing at Fpa (which is close to F status quo). The probability of SSB being 
below Bpa increases from 0.38 in 2007 to 0.55 in 2015 in the Fpa scenario and decreases to 0 in 
the rest of the scenarios. In terms of CPUEs, they remain almost constant in the Fpa strategy 
and increase by 200%, 170% and 150% in the case of 0.8*Fmax, Fmax and 120% Fmax strategies 
respectively. 
The faster the decrease in F the faster the SSB stabilizes. This leads however to larger losses 
in yields in the short term. 
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Reductions in F towards Fmax results in short term losses if the reductions in F are greater than 
5% per year.  
Ftarget will be achieved in all scenarios by 2015, except in the scenario that reduces F to 
0.8*Fmax at a rate of 5% per year.  
A decrease in F in the fleets catching Hake will also affect the Fs on other species associated 
in the catch like monkfish and megrim. However, the magnitude of the decrease in F on such 
species will be lower. 
Taking discards into account leads to a different perception of the stock. Current F is equal to 
0.24 and Fmax is equal to 0.12.  
Figure 5.2.1: Hake F at age  
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The pink line is the F given by the 'current' assessment based on landings only.  The blue line 
gives F at age from XSA with Catches. F are Fsq mean 2004-2006. 
The expected gains in long-term yields are larger in this scenario but reductions in F to reach 
Fmax would then need to be larger. If the reduction in F is coupled with changes in the 
selection pattern (by decreasing F in younger ages), this would increase further the maximum 
expected yields and  at the same time reduce the decrease in F needed to get to Fmax.  
Changing current F to 0.8*Fmsy or 1.2*Fmsy would lead to similar yield at long-term but to 
different levels of SSB and CPUE.  
5.3 STECF main comments and conclusions on the results of the Lisbon meeting. 
STECF noted that there is little difference, in terms of long-term yields, between Fmax and 
Fpa/Fsq scenarios. STECF noted however that reducing F to Fmsy as opposed to Fpa would lead 
to higher SSB and thus give the stock more stability, reducing the risk of getting back to an 
unsafe situation. This could also improve economic efficiency. 
STECF noted that a 5% decrease in F would lead to Fmax before 2015 without significant loss 
in yields at short term. 
Finally, STECF noted that inclusion of discard estimates in the analysis creates a stronger 
positive effect on yield and SSB when F is reduced. Furthermore, inclusion of discards in 
simulations where the selection pattern is changed to reduce F on younger ages produces 
positive benefits of similar magnitude to reductions in overall F. These analyses are based on 
preliminary and incomplete estimates of discards quantities, nevertheless, STECF is aware 
that discarding takes place and considered, therefore, that the output gives a better 
representation than when discards are excluded. STECF recommended that in any 
management plan involving a move towards an Fmax target, measures which improve the 
selection pattern should be included.  
  
5.4 Selected Management scenarios  
Following the results presented above and recommendations made by STECF, the current 
group SGBRE-07-05 decided to carry out the analysis of the socio-economic impacts only on 
a selection of the management scenarios tested during the Lisbon meeting. This includes two 
sets of simulations: 
• One set of simulations is based on the “base-case” assessment (i.e., without accounting 
for discards) conducted by ICES (2007) and includes: 
o A status-quo or Fpa scenario in which F is kept constant at 0.25. 
o 5, 10 and 15% decrease on a yearly basis towards Fmax (0.17). 
o same scenario with decrease of F towards 0.8*Fmax and 1.2*Fmax 
• Another set is based on an alternative assessment conducted with an ad-hoc rebuilding 
of historical discards. In this set, improvement in selection patterns have also been 
investigated. It thus includes. 
o A status-quo F simulation 
o A 10% decrease in F towards Fmax 
o A drastic improvement in selection pattern (H2, see above) at constant F 
o A drastic improvement in selection pattern with a 10% decrease in F towards 
Fmax. 
5.5 No policy change   
It is important to note that the so-called Fpa scenario tested by SGBRE-07-03 corresponds to a 
status quo (or no policy change scenario) as the current value of F estimated by ICES (2007) 
is very close to the Fpa defined for this stock. 
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6 BASELINE SITUATION FOR EACH MS OF THE FISHERY IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TERMS 
6.1 Spain 
The Northern Hake catches made by the Spanish fleet are concentrated on a single fleet 
named the “300 fleet” (this fleet accounts for all the Spanish catches of Northern Hake). It is 
captured in a wide area covering the Western Atlantic Waters (ICES sub-areas VI-VII and 
Divisions VIIIabd). The different métiers existing in this fleet catch Hake sometimes as a 
single species fishery (longliners and pair trawlers), as a target species in a mixed fishery 
context, where up to 30 species are captured (netters and part of the bottom single trawlers), 
and finally fisheries targeting some other species (mainly anglerfish and megrim) which is the 
case of the remaining bottom single trawlers. 
By the end of the 70’s this fleet consisted of more than 500 vessels but the situation changed 
in 1986. When Spain entered the EEC, the fleet authorized to fish in these waters was 
composed of 300 boats with the following mean technical characteristics: 
 
Table 6.1.1: Capacity indicators of the Spanish “300 Fleet” in 1986 
Gear Nº of Boats GRT HP 
Trawl 201 234 796 
Fixed gears 100 207 699 
Total 300 225 759 
Source: Adhesion Treaty of Spain to the EEC (1985) Fixed gears: long-line and gill net. 
After Spain entered the EEC the different Multi Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP) 
implemented had a great impact on this fleet, reducing the number of vessels. In 2000 this 
fleet consisted of 199 units (Table 6.1.2). 
 
Table 6.1.2: Capacity indicators of the Spanish “300 Fleet” in 2000 
Gear Nº of Boats GRT Length (m) HP KW 
Trawl 115 210 29 685 504
Fixed gears 84 188 28 664 489
Total 199 201 29 676 497
Source: Secretaría General de Pesca Marítima (SGPM). Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fish and Food (2003) Fixed gears: long-line and 
gill net. 
The distribution of the effort (in days) of this fleet by sub-units (modality) and sea area in that 
year is presented in Table 6.1.3. 
 
 
 
  
Table 6.1.3: Geographical effort distribution of the Spanish fleet catching Northern Hake 
Sub-unit VI VII VIIIabde Total 
Otter Bottom Trawl 2218 16216 4226 22660
Pair Bottom Trawl 0 1538 5912 7450
Long line 2926 8252 1342 12520
Gill net 6 2046 1087 3139
Total 5150 28052 12567 45769
Source: SGPM. Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fish and Food (2003) 
Big differences can be observed between sea areas, with effort representing about 10% (sub-
area VI), 60% (sub-area VII) and 30% (Div. VIIIabde). This heterogeneous distribution of the 
fishing effort between sea areas is partly due to the existing Spanish Quota allocation by sea 
area on demersal fish, that practically are reduced to Hake, Anglerfish, Megrim and Nephrops 
(between the species submitted to the TACs and Quotas regime) in the mentioned sea areas. It 
is to be noted that not always the same ship operate in the same sea area throughout  the year, 
depending on its tactical decisions but also on having available the access rights to each sea 
area. 
Some 29% of Northern Hake landings in 1999 in Spain by Spanish vessels were made into the 
port of Celeiro, in Galicia, and 19% to Ondarroa, in Basque Country. Other important ports of 
Hake landings are Coruña (15%), Burela (11%), Pasajes (9%) and Vigo (8%).  
Also in terms of enforcement in the Northern Hake emergency and recovery plans (Council 
Regulation (EC) 811/2004; Commission Regulation (EC) 1162/2001, 2602/2001 and 
494/2002). it was stated that, if the vessel has more than 500 Kg. of Hake inside, it has to be 
communicated to the authorities of the MS and the landing ports have to be listed by the MS 
and reported to Commission. These ports (besides above ones) are: Santoña (Cantabria), 
Santander (Cantabria), Avilés (Asturias), Gijón (Asturias), Riveira (Galicia), Cariño (Galicia) 
and Marín (Galicia). 
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Figure 6.1.1: Spanish Hake landings in volume per harbour (1999) 
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Others: Norway lobster, whiting, horse mackerel, blue whiting.       Source: OECD (2004): Further examination of economic aspects relating 
to the transition to sustainable fisheries: A case of study, AGR/FI(2004)5/PART6. 
In 2004 the main fishing units found for the Spanish fleet are summarised in table 6.1.4. 
  
 
Table 6.1.4: Spanish Hake landings in volume per segment (2004) 
Spain -Relative Hake catches 
(2004)  
 
Hooks Nets Hooks 
Nephrops 
Trawl Fish Trawl Other 
 
DCR Segment Fleet 
Length 
Class 
 
 
FU 1 
FU 3 + FU 
13 
FU 2 + FU 
12 FU 8 + FU 9 
FU 4 + FU 
5 + FU 10 
+ FU 14 
FU 16 + 
FU 00 
Total 
Métier 
DTS - Targeted Nephrops 12-24m          
DTS - Targeted Fish 12-24m           
DTS 24-40m        37.97 %   37.97%
Pair DTS 24-40m    18.01%  18.01%
Hook 24-40m 29.00%   15.02%       44.02%
Netters 12-24m         
Netters 24-40m         
Other -          
Total Segment Fleet   29.00% 15.02% 55.98% 100%
Source: AZTI (SEAS) and UVIGO     Netters are included in the longliners segment (fixed gears). 
Table 6.1.5: Total Spanish Hake landings in volume and Value per segment (2004) 
Spain (2004) – Hake catches in volume and Value 
Segment Fleet 
Length 
Class 
Number of 
vessels 
catching at 
least 1 tonne 
Hake per year 
Tonnes 
(2004) 
1000 € 
(2004) % Tonnes % Value 
Demersal Trawlers  - Targeted 
Nephrops 12-24m      
Demersal Trawlers  - Targeted 
Fish 12-24m      
Demersal Trawlers   24-40m 93 12 793 24 460 44.06 % 20.29% 
Pair Demersal Trawlers 24-40m 20 2 190 6 967 7.54% 5.78% 
Hook 24-40m 84 14 056 89 151 48.40% 73.94% 
Netters 12-24m      
Netters 24-40m      
Other -      
Total    29 039 120 578 100% 100% 
Source: AZTI (SEAS) and UVIGO                    Netters are included in the longliners segment (fixed gears). 
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Three types of fishing gears can be found in the Spanish fleet catching the northern stock of 
Hake, bottom trawlers, longliners and netters. For the case of Bottom trawlers these can be 
divided into two categories, single otter trawlers, that face a pure multi-species fishery, and 
very high vertical opening pair trawlers for which catches are composed mainly of Hake. 
After analyzing the Spanish fleet data for 2003-05 from DCR data, the following problems 
have been detected: 
- Some Spanish sword-fisher vessels are included in the long-liners segment with similar 
length. 
- There is not a differentiation between trawlers form the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. 
In consequence, the economic concepts are including figures from very different fisheries. 
Taking account these problems and specially that the economic Development was different 
for pelagic and demersal species in that period, we have not used the DCR data. Hence the 
data sources are those collected under the Concerted Action for the period 2002-2004 and 
those collected by AZTI (SEAS) .The Development of the main economic and social 
indicators for the period 2002-2004 for Spain are shown in Table 6.1.6. 
Table 6.1.6: Economic and social indicators. 2002-2004 Spain. 
Total Spanish fleet      
  2002 2003 2004
     
Value of landings 189998318 197382447 212056742
Fuel costs 24973512,06 27692260,56 31625389
Other running costs 19767722,52 23295065 35969018,65
Vessel costs 24150554 23171644,29 18174103
Crew share 86119392,05 87679071,67 92902552,24
Gross cash flow 34987137,37 35544405,49 33385679,12
Depreciation 23901903,64 24802801,39 26202051,86
Interest 1985390,25 2103863,322 1932882,812
Net profit 9099843,476 8637740,776 5250744,447
Gross value added 121106529,4 123223477,2 126288231,4
Invested capital 190245817,8 188652916,8 167483649,3
Employment on board 2332 2224 2199
days at the sea 50652 50562 51425
number of vessels 201 199 197
Source: AZTI (SEAS) and Dpt of Applied Economics, Univ of Vigo.  Constant Euros of 2005 
 
 
 
  
The following is emphasized about the economic and social indicators. 
- The Gross Value Added (GVA) was increased by 1% in that period. 
- The net profit, however, declined by 26% due to increasing fuel costs and other 
running costs. 
- The crew share grew by 1% in the period 2002-04. 
- The Gross cash flow (GCF) decreased by 5% in the period. 
- The employment on board declined by 3%. 
- The number of vessels in the fishery decreased by 1%.  
Given that due to the data collecting procedure we cannot separate longliners and netters we 
consider only three segments: Longliners (24-40m), Demersal trawlers (24-40m) and Pair 
demersal trawlers (24-40m). The relevant economic and social indicators are showed in the 
Tables 6.1.7-6.1.9.  
Table 6.1.7: Economic and social indicators. Longliners segment Spain. € 
Longliners 24-40m       
  2002 2003 2004
     
Value of landings 83394114 83417385 90970320
Fuel costs 5856600 6124335 7300860
Other running costs 11674844 12125845 20030640
Vessel costs 8942968 8846205 3794784
Crew share 43798768 44043685 44804508
Gross cash flow 13120934 12277315 15039528
Depreciation 10536290 10413775 10711260
Interest 964318 980475 859236
Net profit 1620326 883065 3469032
Gross value added 56919702 56321000 59844036
Invested capital 73274924 80342340 69892704
Employment on board 1204 1190 1176
Days at the sea 22188 22100 21924
Number of vessels 86 85 84
Source: AZTI (SEAS) and Dpt of Applied Economics, Univ of Vigo 
The following conclusions can be drawn regarding the longliners segment: 
- The GVA was increased by 1% in that period. 
- The net profit grew notably due to decreasing vessel costs, crew share, interests and 
depreciation costs for this segment. 
- The crew share decreased by 2% in the period 2002-04. 
- The GCF was increased by 4% in the period. 
- The employment on board declined by 1%. 
- The number of vessels in the fishery decreased by 1% in this period.  
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Table 6.1.8: Economic and social indicators. Demersal trawling segment Spain. € 
Trawlers (S) 24-40m       
  2002 2003 2004
     
Value of landings 94523204 96056062 101914422
Fuel costs 17386710 18886480 21182889
Other running costs 5906584 7107810 12071121
Vessel costs 12971906 12796878 11783379
Crew share 37869404 36417480 40876476
Gross cash flow 20388600 20847414 16000557
Depreciation 12044032 12044032 12938904
Interest 894128 989632 879594
Net profit 7450440 7813750 2182059
Gross value added 58258004 57264894 56877033
Invested capital 116875464 107057070 97351470
Employment on board 1128 1034 1023
Days at the sea 24346 24064 25389
Number of vessels 94 94 93
Source: AZTII (SEAS) and Dpt of Applied Economics, Univ of Vigo 
In relation with the trawlers, the following trends are emphasized: 
- The GVA decreased by 4% in that period. 
- The net profit declined due to increasing fuel costs and other running costs. 
- The crew share grew by 1% in the period 2002-04. 
- The GCF decreased by 14% in the period. 
- The employment on board declined by 5%. 
- The number of vessels in the fishery decreased by 1%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6.1.9: Economic and social indicators. Pair demersal trawling segment Spain. € 
Trawlers (P) 24-40m      
  2002 2003 2004
     
Value of landings 12081000 17909000 19172000
Fuel costs 1730202,06 2681445,556 3141640
Other running costs 2186294,52 4061410 3867257,647
Vessel costs 2235679,997 1528561,29 2595940
Crew share 4451220,055 7217906,667 7221568,235
Gross cash flow 1477603,368 2419676,487 2345594,118
Depreciation 1321581,641 2344994,389 2551887,859
Interest 126944,2501 133756,3222 194052,8118
Net profit 29077,47647 -59074,22366 -400346,5529
Gross value added 5928823,423 9637583,154 9567162,353
Invested capital 95429,84386 1253506,8 239475,2941
Employment on board 252 240 239 
Days at the sea 4118 4398 4112
Number of vessels 21 20 20
Source: AZTI and Dpt of Applied Economics, Univ of Vigo 
Finally, regarding on the pair trawlers, the following is emphasized: 
- The GVA grew by 23% in the period 2002-04. 
- The net profit declined due to increasing costs. 
- The crew share increased by 24% in this period. 
- The GCF decreased by 22% in the period. 
- The employment on board declined by 1% in this period. 
- The number of vessels in the fishery decreased by 1% in this period.  
6.2 France 
In 2006, the French annual catches of Northern Hake (excluding catches from the 
Mediterranean Sea) amounted to 9,797 tonnes which represented a total value of 40.7 million 
euros. Northern Hake accounts for one of the major species landed by the French fishing 
vessels at national level and contributes to around 5% of the fresh total landings in value. If 
we consider the Atlantic coast vessels (excluding North Sea, Channel and Mediterranean), the 
Northern Hake is the 4th landed species in value behind the Common sole, Nephrops and Sea 
bass. 
The Hake catches are mainly concentrating in the ICES fishing areas VIII (Bay of Biscay) and 
VII (West of Ireland) with major spots in the “Grande Vasière” (VIIIab), the Great Sole and 
Porcupine Bank (VIIj, VIIc). 
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Figure 6.2.1: Geographical distribution of the French Hake catches (2006) – Northern and Southern Stock 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
In 2006, 658 vessels could be considered as belonging to the Hake fishery. The following 
figure shows the huge number of vessels catching less than 1 tonne of Hake per year in 2006 
(almost 600 vessels) and leads to consider in this impact assessment only vessels catching at 
least 1 tonne of Hake annually. 
Figure 6.2.2 Hake landings per vessel (2006) 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
The French Hake fleet represents a global capacity of 220,173 kW and 67,994 GT that is to 
say 32% of the total kW deployed by the French North Sea – Channel – Atlantic vessels. The 
employment on board (including skipper) amounts to 3,077 persons contributing to 30% of 
the direct employment on the French North Sea – Channel – Atlantic coast (measured in 
FTE). 
  
These vessels (catching at least 1 tonne of Hake per year) are heterogeneous in terms of gears 
used and size of the hull. This heterogeneity generates variability of economic indicator, 
therefore vessels were assigned to more homogeneous sub segments. The DCR segmentation 
criteria (dominant gear * Length class) has been retained for the gathering of vessels into 
homogeneous segments regarding economic indicators. On this basis, 5 segments are 
considered: Demersal Trawl (12-24m), Demersal Trawl (24-40m), Hook (24-40m), Netters 
(12-24m), Netters (24-40m). 
Moreover, a deeper analysis of the Demersal Trawl (12-24m) segment shows two different 
groups of vessels regarding their catch composition and their exploitation patterns (length 
distribution of the Hake landings, discards). This is the consequence of practising two 
different “métiers” (or combination of gear*target species). Based on their individual fishing 
calendars, the vessels belonging to the DT segment (12-24m) have been subdivided into two 
sub-segments: DTS “targeting Nephrops” for vessels targeting Nephrops at least 4 months per 
year and DTS “targeting Fish” for the others. 
Finally, 6 segments are retained for the analysis and they contribute to around 90% in volume 
and value to the total Northern Hake landings of the French vessels registered in the North 
Sea, Channel and Atlantic fishing harbours. 
Table 6.2.1: Northern Hake landings France per segment fleet (2006) 
   Hake landings 
Segment 
Contribution 
DCR Segment Fleet Length Class 
Number of 
vessels 
Tonnes 
(2006) 
1000 € 
(2006) Price €/kg 
% 
Tonnes 
% 
Value 
Demersal Trawl Segment –  
Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 204 952 3 888 4.08 10% 10%
Demersal Trawl Segment  - Targeting Fish 12-24m 106 420 1 866 4.44 4% 5%
Demersal Trawl Segment  24-40m 55 1 111 4 308 3.88 11% 11%
Hook 24-40m 5 728 2 995 4.11 7% 7%
Netters 12-24m 60 1 747 7 585 4.34 18% 19%
Netters 24-40m 18 3 775 15 370 4.07 39% 38%
Other - 210 1 063 4 734 4.45 11% 12%
Total   658 9 797 40 745 4.16 100% 100% 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
Netters are the major contributors to the French Hake landings (57% in volume and value) 
with 78 vessels in 2006. Particularly, the large netters (24-40m) contribute to almost 40% of 
the Hake total landings in France. The Demersal trawler segment (DTS) contribute to 26% to 
the total landings with 365 vessels catching at least 1 tonne of Hake in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  32
 
Table 6.2.2: Geographical distribution of the vessels (2006) 
  
DTS - 
Nephrops 
12-24m 
DTS  - 
Fish 12-
24m 
DTS  24-
40m 
Hook 24-
40m 
Netters 
12-24m 
Netters 
24-40m Other - Total 
Nord Pas de Calais  8 8
Nord Bretagne 21 11 2  6 40
Le Guilvinec 105 26 9 3  16 159
Concarneau 14 8 13 2  38 75
Lorient 38 7 7  20 72
Autres Sud Bretagne (Douarnenez, 
Audierne, Auray, Vannes) 5 2 1 4  7 19
Pays de Loire 13 22 2 15  76 128
La Rochelle 9 6 2 4 2 2 25
Oléron, Marennes 20 4 3  4 31
Bayonne 7 12 3 9 16 30 77
Arcachon 10 11  3 24
TOTAL 204 106 55 5 60 18 210 658
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
The large netters are registered in the South Atlantic harbours (Bayonne mostly) and benefit 
from the proximity of Spain in terms of market opportunities. On the other side, trawlers are 
mostly located in the South Brittany fishing harbours (Le Guilvinec, Concarneau and Lorient). 
  
 
Figure 6.2.3: Geographical distribution of Hake landings (2006) 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
Due to the geographic location of vessels, the Hake landings are mainly concentrated in the 
ports of the French South Atlantic. More than 50% of the 2006 landings (in value) come from 
vessels registered in the port of Bayonne; 13% in the port of La Rochelle. In total, the whole 
South Brittany harbours accounts for 21% of the total production of Hake in value. 
Figure 6.2.4: Seasonality of Hake landings (2006) 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
The analysis of landings per month doesn’t show a marked seasonality in Hake landings. 
Based on 2006 data, Hake landings occur all along the year actually between 600 to 800 
tonnes per month with the exception of the period from May to August where the large netters 
are increasing their contribution to the total landings. 
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Figure 6.2.5: Seasonality of Hake landing prices (2006) 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
The Hake quayside price varies between 4.0 and 4.6 €/kg in average. The price correlates with 
the seasonality of landings. An increasing trend is observed from January to April, followed 
by a decrease from April to July. This period is corresponding to an increase in landings 
particularly due to the contribution of large netters. Then, the price remains quite stable 
between July and October and observes again an increasing trend from October to December. 
In general, prices registered by trawlers are below the average and prices registered by the 
category “Other” are much higher than average. As it will be seen in the description of vessels 
per segment, the average size of vessels belonging to this “Other category” is lower and these 
very coastal vessels are expected to land fresh fish with higher value. 
The contribution per segment fleet to the total landings of Hake can be refined using the 
fleet*métier (or fleet*FU) based approach in order to implement more detailed bio economic 
analysis. For convenience, the different FUs considered in the biological analysis were 
gathered into larger FUs (ICES 2007). 
  
 
Table 6.2.3: The French Hake landings in volume (the fleet * métier based approach) (2006) 
  Nets Hooks 
Nephrops 
Trawl Fish Trawl Other 
  
DCR Segment Fleet 
Length 
Class 
FU 3 + FU 
13 
FU 2 + FU 
12 FU 8 + FU 9 
FU 4 + FU 5 + FU 
10 + FU 14 
FU 16 + FU 
00 
Total Métier 
(FU) 
DTS - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m   952 (10%)    952 (10%) 
DTS - Targeting Fish 12-24m    420 (4%)   420 (4%) 
DTS 24-40m    1 111 (11%)   1 111 (11%) 
Hook 24-40m  728 (7%)     728 (7%) 
Netters 12-24m 1 747 (18%)      1 747 (18%) 
Netters 24-40m 3 775 (39%)      3 775 (39%) 
Other -     1 063 (11%) 1 063 (11%) 
Total Segment Fleet   5 523 (56%) 728 (7%) 952 (10%) 1 531 (16%) 1 063 (11%) 9 797 (100%) 
Source: IFREMER (SIH-ISIH) - Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) 
This fleet-métier based approach could be very useful for the definition of specific 
management measures rather then aiming for a general objective of Global Fishing Mortality 
reduction. As fleets (or métiers) do not have identical or even similar exploitation patterns 
targeting F tailored to the specific fleet segment/métier would account for these differences 
and would be more effective and efficient in the management set up. 
The following table gives an indicator of Hake dependency of each segment measured with 
the contribution of Hake in their total landings in volume and value. A very strong 
dependency on Hake is observed for both netters 24-40m (for which Hake landings represent 
more than 80% of the total landings) and Hook 24-40m (77% of the total gross earnings). This 
dependency is much lower for all trawlers. 
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Table 6.2.4: Hake and other specie dependency per segment fleet, France (2006) 
DCR Segment Fleet Length Class Number of vessels % Tonnes % Value 
HAKE   
Demersal Trawl Segment - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 204 5% 4%
Demersal Trawl Segment  - Targeting Fish 12-24m 106 2% 2%
Demersal Trawl Segment  24-40m 55 5% 6%
Hook 24-40m 5 71% 77%
Netters 12-24m 60 29% 20%
Netters 24-40m 18 81% 84%
NEPRHOPS   
Demersal Trawl Segment - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 204 24% 45%
ANGLERFISH   
Demersal Trawl Segment - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 204 11% 12%
Demersal Trawl Segment  - Targeting Fish 12-24m 106 17% 27%
Demersal Trawl Segment  24-40m 55 17% 27%
SOLE   
Netters 12-24m 60 29% 46%
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
A brief analysis of the catch composition of each fleet segment shows the relative importance 
of Nephrops and Anglerfish for the DTS 12-24m “targeting Nephrops” (respectively 45% and 
12% of the total earnings), Anglerfish for the DTS 12-24m “targeting fish” and DTS 24-40m 
(27% of the total earnings for each) and Sole for the Netters 12-24m (46% of the total 
earnings). 
The analysis of contribution and dependency is fundamental for the impact assessment. It 
must be supplemented with a presentation of the total and average capacity and fishing effort 
deployed by each segment. Despite their low level of dependency towards Hake, trawlers 
deploy an important capacity and effort which could be an issue as it concerns mixed 
fisheries. 
  
Table 6.2.5: Capacity and Employment per fleet segment (2006) 
DCR Segment Fleet Length Class 
Number of 
vessels Total kW Total GT 
Total Days 
at sea 
Total 
Employment 
(FTE) 
DTS - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 204        60 260         14 028         32 290  759 
DTS  - Targeting Fish 12-24m 106 39 694   11 440    21 470  490 
DTS  24-40m 55 32 342  13 030  14 471  389 
Hook 24-40m 5 2 648  1 191  1 118  62 
Netters 12-24m 60 17 177  4 810  10 299  351 
Netters 24-40m 18 9 168  4 464  4 499  223 
Other - 210 58 884  19 031  20 278  803 
Total  658 220 173 67 994 104 426 3 077 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
Table 6.2.6: Average features of vessels (capacity, effort, employment) per fleet segment (2006) 
DCR Segment Fleet Length Class Number of vessels Average kW Average GT 
Average 
 length (m) 
DTS - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 204 295 69 17 
DTS  - Targeting Fish 12-24m 106 374 108 20 
DTS  24-40m 55 588 237 30 
Hook 24-40m 5 530 238 32 
Netters 12-24m 60 286 80 18 
Netters 24-40m 18 509 248 30 
Other - 210 280 91 15 
      
DCR Segment Fleet Length Class Average crew Average Days at sea 
Average age of 
vessels 
Average Age of 
skipper (if 
vessel owner) 
DTS - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 4 158 19 42 
DTS  - Targeting Fish 12-24m 5 203 18 42 
DTS  24-40m 7 263 20 - 
Hook 24-40m 12 224 34 - 
Netters 12-24m 6 172 19 43 
Netters 24-40m 12 250 27 - 
 Source: Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA-BCS) - IFREMER SIH-ISIH 
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Trends in economic indicators during the period 2004-2006 are analysed fleet by fleet. Data 
used are coming from the IFREMER SIH dataset and partly contribute to the calculation of 
the French Annual Economic Indicators for the Module J of the DCR. Insofar as the DCR 
historical economic indicators do not distinguish running costs from vessels costs within 
operational costs, they cannot be used for the EIAA model.  
Table 6.2.7: The French sample for the calculation of Economic indicators 
  Number of vessels Economic sample 
DCR Segment Fleet Length Class Total Hake fishery % Total %  
DTS - Targeting Nephrops or Fish 12-24m 447 310 69% 42 9% 
DTS  24-40m 82 55 67% 16 20% 
Hook 24-40m 6 5 83% 4 67% 
Netters 12-24m 136 60 44% 28 21% 
Netters 24-40m 19 18 95% 8 42% 
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
The fleet segments considered in this impact assessment are subsets of large DCR segments 
for which economic data are collected. The average cost structure of larger segments is 
assumed to be valid for subsets of the segment 
  
* Demersal Trawl Segment - Targeting Nephrops 12-24m 
- Between 2005 and 2006, despite the increase in fuel costs, increase in GVA due to 
increase in value of landings and decrease in other operational costs: 
- Between 2005 and 2006, slight decrease in employment and nominal effort while capacity 
indicators remained quite the same, increase in invested capital. 
- No major change in profitability during the period (near zero). 
 
Table 6.2.8: Economic Indicators for the DTS Targeting Nephrops segment 12-24m. (2004-2006). m€ 
Population of vessels landing at least 1 
tonne of Hake per year 
Demersal Trawl Segment - Targeting Nephrops 
12-24m  
  2004 2005 2006 
Economic indicators       
Value of landings 98.4 95.1 98.1 
Fuel costs 16.5 18.5 20.2 
Other running costs 11.7 10.3 9.7 
Vessel costs 23.7 23.1 22.9 
Crew share 34.9 32.5 32.1 
Gross cash flow 11.6 10.7 13.2 
Depreciation 9.4 9.2 8.8 
Interest 1.3 1.4 1.6 
Net profit 0.9 0.1 2.8 
Gross value added 46.5 43.2 45.4 
Other economic indicators       
Employment on board (FTE) 873 816 759 
Invested capital (mEUR) 146.5 130.5 141.9 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 34.5 33.1 32.3 
Capacity indicators       
Volume of landings (1000t) 23.7 21.3 20.1 
Fleet - number of vessels 211 202 204 
Fleet - total GRT (1000) 9.9 9.6 9.6 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 14.4 13.8 14 
Fleet - total kW (1000) 61.4 59.3 60.3 
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
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* Demersal Trawl Segment - Targeting Fish 12-24m: 
- Between 2005 and 2006, strong decrease in capacity and nominal effort while a minor 
increase appeared between 2004 and 2005 
NB: In this particular segment where Hake is not a major species, the threshold of 1 tonne for 
Hake could be the reason for the important inter-annual variation of nominal effort. 
Table 6.2.9: Economic Indicators for the DTS Targeting Fish segment 12-24m.  (2004-2006). m€ 
Population of vessels landing at least 1 
tonne of Hake per year Demersal Trawl Segment  - Targeted Fish 12-24m 
  2004 2005 2006 
Economic indicators       
Value of landings 89.8 98.4 77.6 
Fuel costs 15.1 19.2 15.9 
Other running costs 10.7 10.6 7.7 
Vessel costs 21.6 23.9 18.1 
Crew share 31.8 33.6 25.4 
Gross cash flow 10.6 11.1 10.5 
Depreciation 8.6 9.5 7.0 
Interest 1.2 1.5 1.3 
Net profit 0.8 0.1 2.2 
Gross value added 42.4 44.7 35.9 
Other economic indicators       
Employment on board (FTE) 658 696 490 
Invested capital (mEUR) 92.4 93.0 73.7 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 28.6 30.9 21.5 
Capacity indicators       
Volume of landings (1000t) 29.9 31.6 22.5 
Fleet - number of vessels 133 144 106 
Fleet - total GRT (1000) 9.4 10.2 7.8 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 13.7 14.8 11.4 
Fleet - total kW (1000) 49.5 52.9 39.7 
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
  
* Demersal Trawl Segment 24-40m 
- Decrease in capacity of effort during the period but mainly between 2005 and 2006  
- Fuel costs and running costs remain high while a strong decrease in the value of landings 
is observed in 2006 
- Net profits are negative or around 0 during the period. 
 
Table 6.2.10: Economic Indicators for the DTS 24-40m.  (2004-2006). m€ 
Population of vessels landing at least 1 
tonne of Hake per year Demersal Trawl Segment  24-40m 
  2004 2005 2006 
Economic indicators       
Value of landings 75.8 79.5 67.5 
Fuel costs 14.0 16.8 15.4 
Other running costs 9.1 7.8 7.1 
Vessel costs 21.8 19.9 16.2 
Crew share 23.5 24.2 20.1 
Gross cash flow 7.5 10.8 8.7 
Depreciation 9.4 9.4 8.1 
Interest 1.5 1.3 1.6 
Net profit -3.4 0.1 -1.0 
Gross value added 30.9 35.0 28.9 
Other economic indicators       
Employment on board (FTE) 549 499 389 
Invested capital (mEUR) 89.4 73.0 66.3 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 18.6 18 14.5 
Capacity indicators       
Volume of landings (1000t) 29.2 29 22.3 
Fleet - number of vessels 68 66 55 
Fleet - total GRT (1000) 12.4 11.9 10.2 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 15.9 15.3 13 
Fleet - total kW (1000) 40.5 38.9 32.3 
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
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* Hook 24-40m 
- No vessels in this segment before 2006  
- Profitability around 7% of the capital invested 
Table 6.2.11: Economic Indicators for the Hook segment 24-40m.  (2004-2006). m€ 
 Population of vessels landing at least 1 
tonne of Hake per year Hook 24-40m 
Economic indicators 2004 2005 2006
Value of landings 0.0 0.0 3.9
Fuel costs 0.0 0.0 0.5
Other running costs 0.0 0.0 0.4
Vessel costs 0.0 0.0 0.7
Crew share 0.0 0.0 1.5
Gross cash flow 0.0 0.0 0.8
Depreciation 0.0 0.0 0.3
Interest 0.0 0.0 0.2
Net profit 0.0 0.0 0.3
Gross value added 0.0 0.0 2.3
Other economic indicators       
Employment on board (FTE) 0 0 62
Invested capital (mEUR) 0 0 4.4
Effort (1000 days at sea) 0 0 1.1
Capacity indicators       
Volume of landings (1000t) 0 0 1
Fleet - number of vessels 0 0 5
Fleet - total GRT (1000) 0 0 1
Fleet - total GT (1000) 0 0 1.2
Fleet - total kW (1000) 0 0 2.6
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
  
* Netters 12-24m 
- Slight decrease in capacity and effort between 2005 and 2006 after a strong increase 
between 2004 and 2005. 
- Between 2005 and 2006, strong decrease in GCF and Net profit due to increase in fuel 
costs and vessel costs while value of landings remains quite stable 
- Decrease in profitability between 2005 and 2006 but remains positive. 
 
Table 6.2.12: Economic Indicators for the Netters segment 12-24m.  (2004-2006). m€  
  Population of vessels landing at least 1 
tonne of Hake per year Netters 12-24m 
Economic indicators 2004 2005 2006
Value of landings 29.9 37.3 37.9
Fuel costs 1.6 2.2 3.0
Other running costs 2.6 3.2 3.1
Vessel costs 7.4 7.6 9.7
Crew share 12.1 14.9 15.0
Gross cash flow 6.2 9.5 7.1
Depreciation 2.4 2.4 2.8
Interest 0.3 0.5 0.6
Net profit 3.6 6.6 3.7
Gross value added 18.3 24.4 22.2
Invested capital 24.6 31.2 30.8
Other economic indicators       
Employment on board (FTE) 345 364 351
Invested capital (mEUR) 24.6 31.2 30.8
Effort (1000 days at sea) 10 11.1 10.3
Capacity indicators       
Volume of landings (1000t) 5.6 6.6 6
Fleet - number of vessels 56 62 60
Fleet - total GRT (1000) 3 3.4 3.2
Fleet - total GT (1000) 4.7 5.1 4.8
Fleet - total kW (1000) 16.5 18.2 17.2
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
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* Netters 24-40m 
- Slight decrease in capacity and effort between 2005 and 2006 (move to the “hook fleet” 
after change in the fishing strategy) after an increase between 2004 and 2005. 
- Decrease in profitability between 2005 and 2006 but remains high. 
 
Table 6.2.13: Economic Indicators for the Netters segment 24-40m.  (2004-2006). m€ 
   Population of vessels landing at least 1 
tonne of Hake per year Netters 24-40m 
Economic indicators 2004 2005 2006
Value of landings 20.7 25.5 18.3
Fuel costs 1.8 2.4 1.7
Other running costs 2.2 2.4 1.5
Vessel costs 3.9 4.3 3.8
Crew share 6.0 10.0 7.3
Gross cash flow 6.8 6.4 4.0
Depreciation 2.4 1.9 1.4
Interest 0.3 0.6 0.4
Net profit 4.1 3.9 2.2
Gross value added 12.8 16.4 11.3
Invested capital 28.2 21.8 17.2
Other economic indicators       
Employment on board (FTE) 241 266 223
Invested capital (mEUR) 28.2 21.8 17.2
Effort (1000 days at sea) 5.2 5.4 4.5
Capacity indicators       
Volume of landings (1000t) 5.2 6.7 4.6
Fleet - number of vessels 20 21 18
Fleet - total GRT (1000) 3.6 3.9 3.2
Fleet - total GT (1000) 4.7 5.2 4.5
Fleet - total kW (1000) 10.4 10.8 9.2
Source: IFREMER SIH – Ministry of Agriculture (DPMA/BCS) 
 
 
  
6.3 The British Fishery for Northern Hake  
Geographical Importance of the Fishery 
British registered vessels receive 10.7% of the European Union’s Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) of Northern Hake. In 2005, landings of Hake into the United Kingdom and abroad by 
British vessels were worth some €13.5m and amounted to 3,600 tonnes, only 87% of the 
quota.  This represents 1.6% of the value of all landings of fish and shellfish into the United 
Kingdom and abroad by British vessels and 3.9% of demersal landings.  Hake is thus the ninth 
most important demersal species to the British fleet.   
Figure 6.3.1: Landings into UK and Abroad by British Vessels and Landings into UK by Foreign Vessels, 2005 
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Source: MFA 
The bulk of the quota is allocated to the large group of ICES sea areas off the west and south 
coasts of Great Britain.  Only 6% of the British quota is allocated to the North Sea (0.6% of 
the EU TAC).  This is reflected in the location of landings. 
In 2005, 40% of landings by value were sourced from ICES sub-area VIa off the west coast of 
Scotland.  Of the sea areas off the south-west coast of England, sub-areas VII h and j provided 
18%, VIIk 9%, and VII f and g 9%.  The Irish Sea, sub-area VIIa provided 7% of landings.  
Thus while the fishery is to be found right round the British Isles, it is concentrated off the 
west coast of Scotland and is of local importance to the south west of England.  Figure 6.3.2 
shows the sources by ICES subarea. 
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Figure6.3.2:  Source of Hake Landings by Value into the UK and Abroad by British Vessels, 2005 
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Source: MFA 
The source of landings is reflected in the location of landings around the British coast, 
although it is worth bearing in mind that the ICES sub-areas are not of equal size. Sub-area 
VIa is comparatively large while the opposite is true of the combined sub-areas VI h and j.   
Some 45% of landings in 2005 into the United Kingdom by British vessels were made into the 
port of Lochinver on the west coast of Scotland.  20% were landed into Newlyn in the south-
west of England, and 8% to Milford Haven in the south-west of Wales. 6% were landed at 
Peterhead on the north east coast of Scotland bordering the North Sea. The value of landings 
of Hake into the major receiving ports is shown in Figure 6.3.3. 
Figure 6.3.3:  Value of Landings of Hake into the United Kingdom by British Vessels, by Port, 2005 
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Source: MFA 
Hake landings into Lochinver contributed 39% of the value of landings there and 51% of 
demersal landings.  Many of the vessels fishing for Hake are Spanish-owned and, while 
carrying the British flag and subject to the British rules relating to economic links, land 
directly into Spain or land into the UK for their catches to be trans-shipped. As such the 
potential value-added is lost to the British economy although there is little demand for Hake 
among British consumers.  Hence the reliance on Hake on-shore in Britain is low. 
83% of landings abroad by British-registered vessels were into Spain and 14% into the 
Republic of Ireland.  In total, landings abroad were worth €3.6m in 2005. 
  
Foreign registered vessels also land into the United Kingdom, Spain offering some 78% and 
France 22% of landings by foreign vessels. The total value of these landings in 2005 was 
€14m. 
Newlyn, England’s most important port by value of landings, represents a partial exception to 
the general pattern. The local fleet is British owned and Hake is the fourth most important 
species landed, after megrims, monks, and soles, providing 9% of landings by value.  The fish 
is landed and sent through the local auction and from there most is sent to Spain.  There are 10 
to 12 vessels of between 12m and 20m registered length with crews of 3 to 5, fishing by gill 
nets. These vessels are approximately 50% dependent on Hake for their earnings. This implies 
that of the approximately 50 jobs at sea, some 25 are dependent on the Northern Hake.  
Scaling this figure up implies that about 200 jobs in the UK fishery out of a total of 11,500 
full-time equivalent jobs owe their existence to Hake fishing. 
Although the fishery takes place throughout the year, springtime and summer see the greatest 
volume and value of landings. The pattern of landings for 2005 is shown in Figure 6.3.4. 
Figure 6.3.4:  Seasonality of Hake Landings demonstrated by the monthly landings by British vessels into the 
United Kingdom for 2005 
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       Source: MFA 
Prices also reflect some seasonality, being best when the quality of the fish is at its best in the 
late spring and responding to fewer landings in winter. The prices obtained in 2005 by month 
are shown in figure 6.3.5.  These averages disguise considerable volatility related to supplies 
from around the world. 
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Figure 6.3.5: Monthly Prices of Hake landed into the United Kingdom by British Vessels, 2005. 
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      Source: MFA 
The Management System 
The British fishery for Hake is carried out under the framework of rules set by the Common 
Fisheries Policy. These include a national quota subdivided from the European Union’s Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC), limitations on days at sea, and technical conservation measures, most 
importantly governing mesh sizes for fishing nets and minimum landing sizes for individual 
fish. 
Quota in the United Kingdom is managed in a number of ways. Where vessels of 10 metres 
and over registered length are members of a Producer Organisation (PO) a quota is allocated 
to their PO according to the vessels’ track record in the years up to 1999 when the system, 
known as Fixed Quota Allocation was introduced.  It is then up to the PO to manage the quota 
as its members agree. In effect this has become an Individual Transferable Quota System 
since vessels can exchange their quota among themselves. POs may also exchange quota for 
other quota or cash.   
Vessels of 10 metres registered length and over which are not members of a Producer 
Organisation receive an allocation of quota based on their track record.   
Vessels under 10m registered length fish from a pool of the quota, usually 10% of the total, 
set aside for them. 
There are currently no limitations on the number of days a vessels may spend at sea fishing 
for Hake. The minimum mesh size permitted on nets is 120mm (diamond). 
A minimum landing size of 27cm is in place.  This is generally lower than for most gadoids 
but reflects market demand in Spain which is for smaller fish which are considered to be 
better flavoured. 
Fleet Costs and Earnings 
The returns for the fleet segment most commonly fishing for Hake is shown in Table 6.3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 6.3.1: Summarised Costs and Earnings for British Demersal Trawlers, Average 2003 to 2005. m€ 
 
  Average 2003-2005 
Demersal trawl and seine 12-24 m   
Value of landings 149.3
Crew share 75.5
Gross cash flow -52.5
Net profit -78.9
Gross value added 23.0
Operating profit margin -52.8%
          Source: Concerted Action 
Unfortunately, no data exists to explain the importance of Hake within the landings of this 
fleet beyond the general comment above.  The demersal trawl fleets in Britain have been 
under considerable pressure in recent years because of cut backs in quota, most notably but by 
no means exclusively, for North Sea cod.  It is probable that the fleets fishing off the west of 
Scotland and the south west of England have suffered less than their compatriots fishing 
exclusively in the North Sea, but many of the larger Scottish trawlers fish in both the North 
Sea and off the Scottish west coast. 
6.4 The Irish Fishery for Northern Hake 
The geographical Importance of the Fishery 
Hake are taken by vessels fishing all round the Irish coast but it is of most importance in the 
South West, notably to Castletownbere and Dingle, but there is little demand for Hake among 
Irish consumers and most is transported to Spain with minimal processing. Thus, despite 
being the sixth most important species to the Irish whitefish fleet, little value-added is derived 
on-shore. 
Most fish is caught by the larger polyvalent vessels using seine nets or gill-nets as well as 
demersal trawl, generally as a bycatch along with megrims, anglerfish, and other whitefish.  
Recent Irish Quotas for the Hake, megrim, and anglerfish are shown in table 6.4.1. 
 
Table 6.4.1:  Irish Quotas for Hake, Megrim and Anglerfish, 2005 to 2007 
Species 2005 2006 2007 
Hake 1,318 1,358 1,629 
Megrims 3,562 3,402 3,362 
Anglerfish 2,370 2,474 2,644 
            Source: European Commission 
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The Management System 
The Irish fisheries fall under the scope of the Common Fisheries and the quotas allocated to 
Ireland are currently operated as a pool available to all. When a quota is deemed to have been 
reached the authorities may close the fishery. 
There are also limitations to fishing effort which are similarly operated as a pool system.  The 
minimum mesh permitted in the fishery is 100mm and the minimum landings size is the EU 
27cm limit. 
Fleet Costs and Earnings 
The Irish whitefish fleet does not target Hake, but the species is the sixth most valuable 
whitefish landed in Ireland by Irish vessels. The average price of Hake from 2000 to 2004 was 
€3,420 per tonne. It is therefore one of the more valuable species and this would value the 
Irish quota at some €5.5m. It has not been possible to obtain data on the contribution of each 
species to the fleet segments analysed.  An average of the performance of Irish whitefish 
vessels over the three year 2002 to 2004 is shown in Tables 6.4.2 a and b. 
Table 6.4.2: Summarised Costs and Earnings for Irish Whitefish Vessels, Average 2003 to 2005. m€ 
a) 
  Average  2003-2005 
Demersal trawl and seine 12-24 m   
Value of landings 63.5
Crew share 15.8
Gross cash flow 9.4
Net profit 7.9
Gross value added 25.2
Operating profit margin 12.4%
          Source: Concerted Action 
 
  
b) 
 Average  2003-2005 
Demersal trawl and seine 24-40 m    
Value of landings 32.9
Crew share 7.5
Gross cash flow 7.3
Net profit 6.4
Gross value added 14.8
Operating profit margin 19.4%
          Source: Concerted Action 
The profit margins shown for both fleet segments appear rather higher than might have been 
expected. The whitefish fishery is acknowledged to have been experiencing significant levels 
of overcapacity and the Irish government has introduced a de-commissioning scheme intended 
to reduce capacity to the level of fishing opportunities. Severe excess capacity in a fleet means 
that the fleet is unlikely to be covering its depreciation charges and is therefore effectively 
making losses. It would appear that these segments are currently operating in a niche which is 
more profitable than the whitefish fishery as a whole. 
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7 ECONOMIC IMPACTS FOR EACH MS BASED ON MODEL PREDICTIONS OF THE LONG TERM 
PLAN AND CURRENT MANAGEMENT 
7.1 Methodology  
The economic impact is assessed by use of a special version of the EIAA model that has been 
developed and used for assessment of economic repercussions of TAC/quota changes since 
2002. The EIAA model is explained in SEC (2004) 17101.  
The model is calibrated by using data for three years that are averaged to level out natural 
variation. This is named the base period. The data originates from different sources and the 
model combines the data. The required data input is costs and earnings information and 
landings compositions of species per fleet segment, see section 4. Further the model is 
calibrated by use of the agreed initial TAC/quotas for the base period, see Council 
Regulations about TAC,  
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/legislation/other/conservation2003_en.htm#tacs .  
The originally developed model calculates the economic repercussions for two years each by 
use of proposed future TAC/quotas and spawning stock biomasses plus a long run case in 
which it is assumed that stocks are recovered. By nesting a series of models is possible to 
make projection for more years. 
A ten years period is normally enough to capture the recovery period for fish stocks subjected 
to management plans. If a longer time horizon is required it is assumed that the situation in 
year ten is describing the subsequent years. In this way the model calculates the economic 
result for number of years that is specified be it 15, 20, or maybe 30 years. 
In most cases long time horizons are not of interest because the task is to compare scenarios 
aiming at selecting the best management plan. Longer time horizons than 10 years will not 
change the rank of the scenarios only the magnitude of the economic benefit. 
The calculations are then carried out by use of the base period information as input to 
calibrate the model and then the projected stock biomasses and yield in terms of landings 
where landings is the yield minus the discard. If discard information is not available the 
projected yield is used as a proxy for the landings. 
The procedure used in the calculation of the Hake Recovery plan is shown in flow chart 1. 
The rectangles are variables and the ovals are control rules. The solid arrows show the causal 
direction in an output based approach while the dotted lines show the causal direction in an 
input based approach. 
                                                     
1 SEC (2004) 1710 “The Potential Economic Impact on Selected Fishing Fleet Segments of TACs Proposed by ACFM for 2005 (EIAA-model 
calculations). Report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF), Subgroup on Economic Assessment 
(SGECA) (Brussels 27-29 October 2004). Commission Staff Working Paper, Brussels, 23.12.2004. 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/publications/factsheets/legal_texts/sec_2004_1710_en.pdf 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.1.1: The working procedure of the EIAA model. 
 
The output based approach is used as the stocks and yield are calculated simultaneously by 
use of a harvest control rule for the fishing mortality rate. Stock and yield are used 
simultaneously in the production function to calculate the required number of sea days to 
catch the yield of the stocks. Finally, the number of vessels is kept constant or alternatively 
calculated by use of a sea day rule concerning the number of sea days per vessels. The 
dependant (flexible) variable in the system that secures a solution is the sea days variable. If 
the fishing mortality rule and the sea days rule do not match, the system cannot be “solved” in 
one step and an iterative procedure must be applied where all the other variables are changed.  
An input based system is shown by the dotted lines. In this system the number of vessels is 
controlled both by use of a sea days control rule specifying sea days per vessel; the landings 
and the yield are calculated. Hence the stock size can be calculated. In this system the 
dependant variables are the yield and the stocks that fluctuate over time. 
Finally, both approaches can be supplemented by and entry/exit function that determines the 
number of vessels. Entry/exit can be controlled by use of restriction on the number of vessels 
and decommissioning programmes. 
The output and the input approach cannot be used at the same time unless rather complex 
models are used. These models are able to distinguish between which of the harvest control 
rules is the most restrictive and then chose whether the causality goes along the solid lines or 
the dotted lines. The EIAA model uses the output based approach taken the harvest control 
rule for fishing mortality and hence the projection of the stocks and the yields as given. 
 
7.2 Selected scenarios and assumptions 
The scenarios selected for further investigation are derived from the working group of 
Northern Hake long-term management plans, Lisbon 4-8- June 2007.  
Stock  year 
1 
Stock year 
2 
Stock 
year 3 
Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3
Days 1 Days 2 Days 3 
Vessels 1 Vessels 2 Vessels 3 
Fishing mortality rule 
Production function 
Sea days rule 
Entry/exit 
function 
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The baseline is the scenario for the precautionary fishing mortality rate (Fpa) i.e. fishing 
mortality rate fixed according to the precautionary principle. The value of Fpa is 0.25 (Lisbon 
report page 19). This value is close to the status quo fishing mortality rate. 
The baseline has been compared to a number of scenarios, nine in total. In the first group, F 
has been reduced annually down to Fmax by 5%, 10% and 15% respectively. In the second and 
third group the same procedure has been used down to 80% of Fmax and 120% of Fmax 
respectively, see the following text table 7.2.1. 
Table 7.2.1: The nine scenario tested against the baseline scenario  
Fmax (0.17) 80% of Fmax (0.136) 120% of Fmax (0.204) 
5% 5% 5% 
10% 10% 10% 
15% 15% 15% 
For Spain three segments have been investigated. The base period is 2002-2004 as regards 
costs and earnings. The quotas for 2005 and 2006 are the agreed quotas. From 2007 all quotas 
except for Hake are the quotas for 2006. For Hake the projected stock biomasses and yield is 
used from 2007. 
For France four segments have been investigated. The base period is 2004-2006 as regards 
cost and earnings. The quotas for 2007 are equal to the agreed quotas for 2006 except for 
Hake where the projected stock biomasses and yield is used from 2008. 
The period over which discounting takes place is nine years. The net present value is 
calculated in fixed base period prices at January 1’st 2007 for Spain and January 1’st 2008 for 
France. 
These differences between countries are not important however as emphasize is placed on 
comparison of scenarios. What is important, however, is that the scenarios within each 
country are evaluated for the same period. 
Further the most important model assumptions are 
1. Landings and stock biomass of Northern Hake are the ones calculated by the “Lisbon 
WG” 
2. Landings and stock biomasses of all other species are kept constant on 2007 level 
forward 
3. The relative stability between Member States is adhered to 
4. The uptake ratio (landings/quota) is calculated for the base period and used forward 
5. The share of the quota per fleet segment is constant and is calculated in the base 
period, that implies that the landings composition per fleet segment will change over 
time 
6. Prices of the species have been kept constant over time but varies across fleet 
segments according to the prices recorded for the base period 
7. No account is taken for FU (fleet segments) exploiting different age groups, which 
develops differently over the recovery period 
8. The effort in terms of sea days is calculated as a function of landings and stock 
biomass by use of an inverse Cobb-Douglas function linked to the landings and the 
stock biomass development  
9. Effort varies proportionately (exponent 1) with the landings but less than 
proportionately with stock biomass (exponent 0.6). Effectively this implies increasing 
  
returns to scale i.e. landings increase more than proportionately with the increase in 
effort and stock biomass. 
10. Effort is driven by all the species in the landings composition of each fleet segment 
11. Fishing costs is a linear function of sea days 
12. Crew share is a fixed proportion of the landing value 
13. Fixed costs are kept constant i.e. the number of vessels in each segment is kept 
constant 
14. Discount rate is 5% and 10% 
15. Number of years for which discounting has been performed is 9 years i.e. it is assumed 
that the recovery period is less than 10 years.  
The costs and earnings information used in the model appears from section 6. It is assumed 
that there are no major changes in the fleet cost structure between the base period and the 
projection period starting form 2007. 
The agreed quotas for Hake in the relevant management areas are shown in Table 7.2.2. There 
are differences between the agreed quotas and the projected yield from the Lisbon working 
group. This difference is not important however as the assessment is made for 2007 and 
onwards. 
Table 7.2.2: Hake quotas as agreed by the Council of Ministers in December 
Management area 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Vb,VI,VII,XII,XIV 15118 16823 21926 23888 24617 29541 
VIIIabde 10083 11220 14623 15932 16419 19701 
Total 25201 28043 36549 39820 41036 49242 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/legislation/other/conservation2003_en.htm#tacs.  
The projections commence with 53 600 tonnes in 2007. The data input for landings is shown 
in figure 7.2.1 for the case where F is reduced down to Fmax. It is noticed that the current 
fishing mortality, indicated by the Fpa, shows that landings increase slightly to a level at 
around 60 000 tonnes. The scenarios showing the adjustments to Fmax are developing 
differently with the highest present reduction in landings for the 15% annual decrease down to 
Fmax but also with the fastest recovery.  
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Figure 7.2.1: Projected yield (landing) for the Fmax case 
 
In general terms costs will decrease when landing go down and increase when landings go up. 
However costs will also be influenced by the stock density. Higher stock density will increase 
catch per unit effort and hence decrease costs relative to landings. 
The impact of the stock density is shown in figure 7.2.2. All scenarios in the Fmax case 
converge towards 350.000 tonnes biomass, however at different speed. 
 
Figure 7.2.2: Projected stock biomass for the Fmax case 
 
The results of the calculations are shown country by country below. Five indicators are used 
to show the result. The indicator “gross value added” encompasses the remuneration of labour 
and capital and is a proxy for the contribution to GDP. In general it is noticed that the 
differences between the scenarios are not large. This is mainly caused by the fact that Hake 
constitutes only a fraction of the total landing value and all other species are kept constant. 
 
 
  
The scenario Fpa is chosen as the baseline scenario. The scenario Fpa is the best. The reason 
for this result is, mainly, that there is no reduction in landings in the early years and the stock 
biomass does not decline. For the other scenarios the negative impact of the reduction in short 
term landings is not counterweighted by the increase in stock biomasses.  
In the table below the summary of the base line situation in the relevant Hake fisheries as have 
been used in the model runs is presented. 
Table 7.2.3: Summary characteristics fleet segments included in evaluation 
      
Hake landings 
Hake dependency (% of Hake in 
total landings per segment fleet) 
Present in 
EIAA 
modelling 
    
Number of 
vessels tonnes millions € volume value   
Spain (2004)               
Demersal Trawlers   24-40m 93 12,793 24,460 21% 24% YES
Pair Demersal Trawlers 24-40m 20 2,190 6,967 43% 36% YES
Hook 24-40m 84 14,056 89,151 97% 98% YES
Total Spain   197 29,039 120,578 35% 59%  
France (2006)              
Demersal Trawl Segment - 
Targeted Nephrops 12-24m 204 952 3,888 5% 4% YES
Demersal Trawl Segment  - 
Targeted Fish 12-24m 106 420 1,866 2% 2% NO
Demersal Trawl Segment  24-40m 55 1,111 4,308 5% 6% YES
Hook 24-40m 5 728 2,995 71% 77% NO
Netters 12-24m 60 1,747 7,585 29% 20% YES
Netters 24-40m 18 3,775 15,370 81% 84% YES
Other - 210 1,063 4,734 - - NO
Total France   658 9,796 40,746      
UK (2005)              
Scottish demersal fleet 12-40m.     4,500     NO
Demersal Trawlers   12-40m.     2000   50% NO
Total UK     3,600 13,500       
Ireland     n.a. n.a.       
 
7.3 France 
The result presented in table 7.3.1 show the combined result for four French fleet segments 
including netters 12-24m and 24-40m, demersal trawl 12-24m targeting nephrops, and 
demersal trawl 24-40m. The period considered in this first analysis is from 2008 to 2016 and 
the scenarios do not take discards into account. 
With emphasizes on the indicator “gross value added” and taking account the uncertainty in 
the input data of the model, there is no significant difference between the 4 following 
scenarios: Fpa, 120% of the Fmax and adjustment of F with 5%, 10% or 15% per year until the 
F target has been reached. However, the slope of the trend slightly differs in the case of the 
Netters 24-40m.  The increase in value of landings and in GVA is slower under the 120% of 
Fmax scenario and with the 15% reduction per year scenario at the beginning of the period but 
develops to a higher value at the end than we see for the other fleet segments. Under a 
constant price assumption, this implies lower landings of Hake on the market at the beginning 
of the period for this scenario. 
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Table 7.3.1: Net present value at 5% and 10% discount rates for four fleet segments for the period 2008 – 2016. 
m € 
  5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Baseline (Fpa)   
Value of landings 2077 1674 2077 1674 2077 1674 
Crew share 699 564 699 564 699 564 
Gross cash flow 394 317 394 317 394 317 
Net profit 207 165 207 165 207 165 
Gross value added 1093 880 1093 880 1093 880 
 To Fmax To 80% of Fmax To 120% of Fmax 
5% reduction             
Value of landings 2032 1639 2026 1635 2054 1655 
Crew share 686 553 684 552 693 558 
Gross cash flow 383 308 381 306 391 313 
Net profit 196 156 194 154 203 161 
Gross value added 1069 861 1065 858 1084 871 
              
10% reduction             
Value of landings 2027 1633 1994 1608 2057 1656 
Crew share 685 552 674 543 694 559 
Gross cash flow 385 308 373 299 393 314 
Net profit 197 156 186 147 205 163 
Gross value added 1070 859 1047 842 1087 873 
              
15% reduction             
Value of landings 2029 1633 1989 1602 2059 1659 
Crew share 686 552 673 542 695 560 
Gross cash flow 387 309 374 299 394 316 
Net profit 199 157 187 147 207 164 
Gross value added 1073 861 1047 841 1089 876 
Looking at the economic impact of different scenarios (with and without discards) using the 
EIAA Model, in the figure below the trends in value of landings per fleet show that the best 
scenarios are obviously the ones based on change in exploitation patterns. These scenarios 
will be largely more beneficial for netters and large netters in particular. 
 
 
  
Figure 7.3.1: The trends in value of landings per fleet 
Netters 12-24m - Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
20
04
-20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
(Fpa)
(5% reduction to Fmax)
(10% reduction to Fmax)
(15% reduction to Fmax)
Netters 12-24m - Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
2004-
2006
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Status quo
10% decrease in F down
to Fmax
H2 at status quo
H2 + 10% decrease in F
to Fmax
 
 Netters 24-40m- Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
20
04
-20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
(Fpa)
(5% reduction to Fmax)
(10% reduction to Fmax)
(15% reduction to Fmax)
Netters 24-40m - Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
2004-
2006
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Status quo
10% decrease in F down
to Fmax
H2 at status quo
H2 + 10% decrease in F
to Fmax
 
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops
- Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
20
04
-20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
(Fpa)
(5% reduction to Fmax)
(10% reduction to Fmax)
(15% reduction to Fmax)
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops
 - Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
2004-
2006
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Status quo
10% decrease in F down
to Fmax
H2 at status quo
H2 + 10% decrease in F
to Fmax
 
Demersal trawl 24-40m- Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
20
04
-20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
(Fpa)
(5% reduction to Fmax)
(10% reduction to Fmax)
(15% reduction to Fmax)
Demersal trawl 24-40m - Value of landings (m€)
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
97.2 104.4 99.2 108.7 108.4 108.3 108.1 108.1 108.2 108.9 109.7
Status quo
10% decrease in F down
to Fmax
H2 at status quo
H2 + 10% decrease in F
to Fmax
 
 
The increase in gross value added observed within the segments of “netters 24-40m.” and 
“netters 12-24m.” confirms the benefits of changes in exploitation patterns scenarios, as 
shown in the figure below. 
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Figure7.3.2: The trends in Gross Value Added 
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In the figure below the results of the different scenarios indicated as share per fleet are 
presented. The discounting rate is assumed to be 5%. The figure presents both the Net Present 
Value and the Gross Added Value. The calculation of the net present values confirms that the 
best scenario is the scenario consisting of improving drastically the exploitation pattern by 
reducing catches of smaller sized Hake. Compared to the baseline situation (without discards), 
the expected net present value of landings is 3% higher and the expected gross value added 
some 8%. Moreover, this scenario will lead to a modification of the structure of the hake 
fishery with an increased share devoted to netters. This conclusion is even more notable with 
  
the analysis of the gross value added due to the current cost structure of this fleet and the 
lower impact of the rise of fuel price for this fleet.   
Figure 7.3.3 The trends in Net Present Value of landings and Gross Value Added under different scenarios for 
the French Fleet 
Net Present Value of landings    Gross Value added  
France - Baseline. NPV: 2076 Mln € DR: 5% ( 2008-2016)
17%
15%
38%
30%
Netters 12-24m Netters 24-40m
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops Demersal trawl 24-40m
Baseline. GVA 1093 Mln € DR: 5% ( 2008-2016)
23%
21%
34%
22%
Netters 12-24m Netters 24-40m
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops Demersal trawl 24-40m
 
France Status Quo (With Discards). NPV: 2017 Mln € DR 5% (2004-2016)
17%
14%
39%
30%
Netters 12-24m Netters 24-40m
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops Demersal trawl 24-40m
France Status Quo (With Discards). 
GVA 1038 Mln € DR 5% (2004-2016)
22%
20%
36%
22%
Netters 12-24m Netters 24-40m
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops Demersal trawl 24-40m
 
France. H2 Status Quo. NPV: 2158  Mln € DR 5% (2004-2016)
18%
17%
36%
29%
Netters 12-24m Netters 24-40m
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops Demersal trawl 24-40m
France. H2 Status Quo. GVA 1175  Mln € DR 5% (2004-2016)
23%
23%
33%
21%
Netters 12-24m Netters 24-40m
Demersal trawl 12-24m targetting nephrops Demersal trawl 24-40m
 
7.4 Spain 
The results presented in table 7.4.1 show the combined result for three Spanish fleet segments 
comprising long liners 24-40m, trawlers (S) 24-40m, and trawlers (P) 24-40m. 
As mentioned in the chapter for France, there is no significant difference between the different 
scenarios. With emphasize on the indicator “gross value added” the best scenario seems to be 
a continuation of the way the fishery is conducted currently i.e. at the level of Fpa. The second 
best solution is to aim at 120% of Fmax and adjust with 15% per year until the target has been 
reached; however, the result is almost the same whether the adaptation is carried through 
quickly or slowly. 
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Table 7.4.1: Net present value at 5% and 10% for three Spanish fleet segments for the period 2006 – 2014. m € 
  To Fmax  
To 80% of 
Fmax   
To 120% of 
Fmax  
  5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
Baseline (Fpa)   
Value of landings 1823 1469 1823 1674 1823 1469 
Crew share 837 674 837 564 837 674 
Gross cash flow 372 299 372 317 372 299 
Net profit 181 144 181 165 181 144 
Gross value added 1210 973 1210 880 1210 973 
  
 
  To Fmax To 80% of Fmax To 120% of Fmax 
5% reduction              
Value of landings 1759 1421 1757 1635 1782 1436 
Crew share 807 652 806 552 818 659 
Gross cash flow 360 289 359 306 365 293 
Net profit 168 134 167 154 174 138 
Gross value added 1167 941 1165 858 1183 953 
              
10% reduction             
Value of landings 1735 1401 1696 1608 1779 1433 
Crew share 797 642 778 543 817 658 
Gross cash flow 356 286 345 299 366 294 
Net profit 164 131 154 147 174 138 
Gross value added 1153 928 1123 842 1183 951 
              
15% reduction             
Value of landings 1731 1396 1677 1602 1778 1432 
Crew share 795 640 769 542 817 657 
Gross cash flow 357 286 343 299 366 294 
Net profit 165 131 151 147 175 138 
Gross value added 1152 926 1112 841 1184 951 
The NPV decreases by 4% and 5% for Spanish fleet in the three scenarios, respectively, 
compared to the baseline situation. The GVA diminishes by 1% and 5%, respectively in the 
three scenarios. By segments, the longline is the most affected segment in terms of NPV and 
GVA (5% and 7% for NPV and 5% and 6% for GVA, respectively). The NPV decreases by 
respectively 2 and 3 per cent for the trawler segment; and the GVA decreases by respectively 
2 and 3 per cent, for the trawlers (S) and trawlers (P).  
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Table 7.4.2: Results by FU for Spain for the different scenarios (without considering discards) 
2006-2014 Baseline(Fpa) Fmax 5% Fmax 10% Fmax 15% 
FU NPV GVA NPV GVA NPV GVA NPV GVA 
FU 1 Longlines 24-40m 946 689 899 657 882 646 879 645 
FU 2 Trawlers (S) 24-40m 739 447 725 438 720 435 719 435 
FU 3 Trawlers (P) 24-40m 137 73 134 72 133 72 133 72 
 1823 1210 1759 1203 1735 1153 1731 1152 
If the discards are considered in the analysis, NPV and GVA decrease by 7% in the Fmax 10% 
scenario in comparison with the baseline situation. By segment, the longline is the most 
affected fleet (10 and 9%, respectively, for the NPV and GVA). The NPV decreases by 4 and 
5% in the trawler (S) and trawler (P) segments, respectively; and the GVA decreases by 4 and 
1%, respectively in each segment. 
In the H2 at status quo scenario, the NPV and GVA, respectively, increase by 6 and 10 per 
cent for the fleet; by 9 and 13% in the longline segment; by 3 and 6% in the trawler (S); and 
by 4 and 9% in the trawler (P). 
In the last scenario (H2+10% decrease in F to Fmax), NPV and GVA, respectively, increase by 
4 and 8% in the fleet; by 6 and 11% in the longliners segment; by 2 and 4% in the trawlers 
(S); and by 2 and 7% in the trawlers (P). 
The best economic results hence are obtained under the H2 at status quo scenario. 
Table 7.4.3: Table Results by FU for Spain for the different scenarios (considering discards) 
2006-2014 
Baseline 
(discards) 
Fmax 10% 
(discards) 
H2 at Status 
quo 
H2 + 10% decrease in F 
to Fmax 
FU NPV GVA NPV GVA NPV GVA NPV GVA 
FU 1 Longlines 24-40m 883 628 797 570 962 712 935 694 
FU 2 Trawlers (S) 24-40m 722 430 696 414 743 454 735 448 
FU 3 Trawlers (P) 24-40m 133 69 127 68 138 75 136 74 
 1737 1127 1620 1052 1843 1241 1807 1217 
The following figures show the trends of the different management strategies under the 
different assumptions about discards in the time period between 2006 and 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7.4.1: Development of profit for FU 1 Longlines 24-40m. (2006-2014) 
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Results show that the FPA  scenario, when not considering discards, shows the best results This 
result is maintained from the initial period till the end of the simulation. The short term impact 
is bigger the higher the degree of allowed reduction. The level of profit recovers to similar 
values as the baseline scenario. 
If discards are taking into account a policy that changes the selection pattern to H2 gives the 
best results. In fact it gives the best results in the long run, even if the short term negative 
impact is one of the highest.  
Figure 7.4.2: Development of profit for FU 2 Trawlers (S) 24-40m. (2006-2014) 
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The conclusions presented for FU1 are also valid for the rest of the FU for Spain in terms of 
NPV. In terms of GVA again results show that the best alternative is a scenario in which the 
selection pattern is changed, even if in the short term the reduction of the GVA is severe. 
A different result is obtained if discards are not considered. Then the simulation predicts a 
higher value of landings for the last year of the simulations in the case of long-liners and pair 
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trawlers (those that face a mono species - Hake - fishery). Even if this result is likely to be 
maintained in the next year, this is not always the case (see Robustness section). 
Figure 7.4.3: Development of profit for FU 3 Trawlers (P) 24-40m. (2006-2014) 
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
20.0
22.0
24.0
20
02
-20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Year
M
ln
 E
ur
o
Baseline
5% reduction FMax 
10% reduction FMax
15% reduction FMax
Baseline with discards
10% reduction Fmax with discards
H2 at status quo
H2 + 10% reduction Fmax
 
 
Figure 7.4.4: Development of GVA for FU 1 Longlines 24-40m. (2006-2014) 
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
110.0
120.0
130.0
140.0
150.0
20
02
-20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Year
M
ln
 E
ur
o
Baseline
5% reduction Fmax 
10% reduction Fmax
15% reduction Fmax
Baseline with discards
10% reduction Fmax with discards
H2 at statu quo
H2 + 10% reduction Fmax
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7.4.5: Development of GVA for FU 2 Trawlers (S) 24-40m. (2006-2014) 
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Figure 7.4.6: Development of GVA for FU 2 Trawlers (P) 24-40m. (2006-2014) 
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Finally in terms of changes in the share of both the GVA and the NPV between the different 
FUs, results show that there are no major changes occurring. This result is rather unexpected 
since what is likely to happen is an increase especially in terms of the share of GVA of those 
segments targeting Hake (FU1 and FU2). This could be due to the fact that in the case of 
Spain (and especially if we compare it with the results obtained with the FUs from France) the 
model has been conditioned using data from 2001 and 2003. It has reduced the last year to the 
simulation to 2014 where the Hake stock has not completely recovered and hence long-liners 
and pair trawlers cannot completely benefit from this improved situation. 
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Figure 7.4.7: Baseline: 1823 m€ (2004-2014) NPV of Landings (Discount Rate : 5%) 
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Figure 7.4.8: 15% Reduction to FMax: 1731  m€ (2004-2014) NPV of Landings (Discount Rate : 5%) 
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7.5 UK 
Economic theory provides a useful benchmark for validating the thrust of the results from the 
financial model. 
The British fleet of vessels over 10m registered length, like the Danish over 10m segment and 
Dutch beam trawlers, run under a reasonably economically efficient management system. The 
British under 10m fleets again with those in Denmark and the Netherlands and fleets in the 
remainder of member states fishing Northern Hake operate with fishing rights which serve as 
  
a common pool and as such are not precisely allocated. Economic theory tells us that the 
British fleets examined in the EIAA model therefore share an open access fishery for Hake. 
That is, at the aggregate level there are no economic institutions which internalise the social 
cost of the catch because the fishing rights are ill-defined.  This means that the whole fishery 
is open access albeit with distortions.  Licensing is not an effective economic constraint on 
fishing as it does not stop the race to fish. 
The fishery should therefore be producing an aggregate zero profit at present (allowing for a 
normal return to capital).  That is, it should be producing a minimum financial profit 
consistent with the return the investment would have made if placed in undated government 
bonds plus a risk premium, but historic over-investment in capacity means that it is unlikely 
that in fact even depreciation is being covered.  British demersal trawlers and seiners are thus 
operating within this context. 
In the long-run (10 years plus) we can expect the British fleet to be operating in a fishery 
shared with other member states which continues to show zero aggregate profitability but 
there will be a shift in capacity away from the economically constrained sectors in the UK, 
Denmark and the Netherlands to the under 10m sectors. In addition, the contraction in the 
British fleet will be counter-balanced by attempts to purchase fishing enterprises in the 
economically inefficient fleets. By and large, however these effects on the fleet will be slight, 
because of the relative unimportance of Hake to most of the whitefish vessels.  
Generally, the British fleet can expect to face a short run stock recovery and improved sales 
revenues which peter out as factor substitution occurs to replace the machine-time constraints 
of effort limitation. The most serious consequence could be that if ownership of the fishing 
rights by enterprises is not clarified and the stock recovery falters then the authorities may 
impose increasingly restrictive effort controls on all fleets. 
Hence, the impact will fall mostly on the fleet fishing off the west coast of Scotland. Even 
there, however, Hake while important is not a primary target. The fleet most significantly 
affected by the impact of the recovery plan will be those fishing out of Newlyn in the south 
west of England. 
7.6 Ireland 
There is insufficient data available to enable the EIAA model to be used to make an 
assessment of the impact of the recovery plan. 
The Irish whitefish fleet currently operates under a system where the fishing rights remain in a 
quota pool. The fleet will, without doubt, benefit from increased landings should the stock 
recover from its current position, but it is not clear that any economic benefit would be 
derived from this. The exception is that more jobs might be created as the fleet tries to expand. 
However, the Irish fisheries management system is presently being reviewed and the 
economic outcome for the Irish fleet will depend on the management system instituted rather 
than the stock recovery programme. Hake is, however, a significant provider of income to the 
Irish fleet and if any new management system clarifies the rights to the Hake quota then the 
fleet stands to enjoy the potential economic benefits of a stock recovery. 
7.7 Discard scenarios 
As presented above, taking discards into account does have a large bearing on the result of the 
analysis. Figure 7.7.1 shows the yield in terms of landings for different scenarios concerning 
reduction of discards. Compared to the status quo and the Fpa scenario it is noticed that it 
would be possible to increase landings significantly.  
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Figure 7.7.1: Projected yield (landing) for the scenarios with reduced discarding 
 
 
If discards could be reduced the stock biomass increases significantly as well compared to the 
status qou scenario, see figure 7.7.2. 
 
Figure 7.7.2 Projected stock biomass for the scenarios with reduced discarding 
 
For the scenarios tested in this section the status quo scenario is serving as base line and the 
H2 at status quo and the H2 + 10% decrease in F down to Fmax serve as alternate scenario. 
The calculations are carried out for the same French and Spanish fleet segments as in the 
paragraphs above. 
The result is shown in table 7.7.1. Compared to the status quo scenario/no policy change the 
scenario H2 is now best followed by scenario H2+10. These two scenarios are also better than 
the Fpa scenario shown in the analysis above.   
  
 
Table 7.7.1 Net present value at 5% and 10% discount rate for Spanish and French fleet segments. m€ 
  Spain France 
  5% 10% 5% 10% 
  2006-2014 2006-2014 2008-2016 2008-2016 
Status quo         
Value of landings 1737 1404 2017 1628 
Crew share 792 640 676 546 
Gross cash flow 335 271 362 292 
Net profit 788 638 175 140 
Gross value added 971 785 1038 837 
H2 at status quo         
Value of landings 1843 1473 2158 1730 
Crew share 850 679 732 587 
Gross cash flow 390 309 443 350 
Net profit 199 154 255 199 
Gross value added 1241 987 1175 937 
H2 + 10% decrease in F to Fmax     
Value of landings 1807 1444 2140 1714 
Crew share 833 665 727 582 
Gross cash flow 383 303 439 347 
Net profit 191 148 251 195 
Gross value added 1217 968 1166 929 
Beneath this result there is a significant increase in landings. This means that it may be 
impossible for the current number of vessels to catch all the fish. An indication of this is 
provided by information about the required number of sea days produced by the existing fleet. 
The result is shown in table 7.7.2. 
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The number of average sea days per vessel is varying from around 170 for the 12-24m to 295 
for the 24-40m for the French segments. For the Spanish segments all of which are 24-40m 
the average number of sea days per vessel is from 207 for trawler (P) to 260 for the two other 
segments.  
 
Table 7.7.2 Number of sea days per fleet segment required to catch the projected yield. 
 
Spain     
 2002-2004 2005 2013 2014 
Status quo     
FU 1 Longlines 24-40m 22071 25631 30462 30660 
FU 2 Trawlers (S) 24-40m 24600 22151 25549 25602 
FU 3 Trawlers (P) 24-40m 4209 4240 4668 4684 
H2 at status quo     
FU 1 Longlines 24-40m 22071 25631 32404 33818 
FU 2 Trawlwers (S) 24-40m 24600 22151 26074 26457 
FU 3 Trawlers (P) 24-40m 4209 4240 4858 4982 
H2 + 10% decrease in F to Fmax    
FU 1 Longlines 24-40m 22071 25631 30996 32408 
FU 2 Trawlwers (S) 24-40m 24600 22151 25692 26075 
FU 3 Trawlers (P) 24-40m 4209 4240 4745 4868 
  
 
France     
 2004-2006 2007 2015 2016 
Status quo     
Netters 12-24m 10467 10204 14656 14705 
Netters 24-40m 5033 5042 9974 10032 
Demersal trawl 12-24m targeting 
nephrops 33300 35611 37535 37556 
Demersal trawl 24-40m 18600 19009 22867 22895 
H2 at status quo     
Netters 12-24m 10467 10204 15986 16172 
Netters 24-40m 5033 5042 11468 11680 
Demersal trawl 12-24m targeting 
nephrops 33300 35611 38113 38194 
Demersal trawl 24-40m 18600 19009 23777 23892 
H2 + 10% decrease in F to Fmax    
Netters 12-24m 10467 10204 15576 15776 
Netters 24-40m 5033 5042 10979 11209 
Demersal trawl 12-24m targeting 
nephrops 33300 35611 37934 38022 
Demersal trawl 24-40m 18600 19009 23570 23694 
It is noticed that for Spanish longliners the required increase in order to maintain their share of 
the higher yield is around 30%, and for French netters 24-40m is around 50% from the base 
period to ten years later. This is probably not possible even taking into account productivity 
increases and an increase in number of vessels. For the rest of the segments no such problems 
would arise. 
For the particular fleet segments for which high increases in sea days required are calculated 
the results for the scenarios, except for the status quo, are overestimated, as new investments 
in vessels are required. However, there are many ways to adjust the fleet over ten years. 
Therefore this path is not pursued further here. 
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8 IMPACTS ON FISHING COMMUNITIES OF EACH MEMBER STATE OF THE LONG TERM PLAN 
AND CURRENT MANAGEMENT 
8.1 France 
It is not possible to produce a quantitative analysis of the socio economic impacts of the 
different scenarios. Based on the trends in the value of landings, gross value added and net 
profits provided by the EIAA model, the different scenarios are leading to better and 
increasing economic performance for netters. For trawlers, the same trends are expected with 
the exception of the first year where there are some slight losses. 
Taking the current structure of the fleets and its geographical location into account, these 
increasing economic results, particularly for netters, would likely benefit employment and 
economic activity in the French south Atlantic harbours. 
Moreover, the model used does not consider fishermen behaviour i.e. the entry and exit 
processes in reaction to profitability. Npoting the recovery of Hake and the expected profits, a 
major issue to be addressed is the regulation of access to the fishery in order to avoid 
overcapacity and rent dissipation.  
8.2 Spain 
Hake is an important fishery for Spain, given that it is a highly demanded fish by Spanish 
consumers. In this sense the long term management plan will have a positive effect on the 
Spanish fishing communities. 
The main ports that account for the mayor part of Hake landings are: A Coruña, Burela, 
Celeiro, Vigo, Avilés, Ondarroa and Pasajes. It is not easy to determine the size of the impact 
on these regions. The direct impact will be derived from the direct effect on fleets (size and 
activity level) and hence on the value added and crew share obtained from them. In addition 
there is an  expected effect on the processing and auxiliary industry. Concerning the effect ion 
the processing industry it should be noted that Hake is sold fresh, without any relevant 
processing activity.  
In the case of Hake it is important also to remark that there is also another important stock of 
the same species (Merluccius merluccius) (Southern stock of Hake) that is captured by 
different fleets but that belong to the same communities. Furthermore in Spain there is another 
factor affecting the communities which are the Hake imports (see Figure 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 8.2.1: Imports of Hake to Spain in volume (Tonnes) 
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Source: FAO 
Figure 8.2.2: Imports of Hake to Spain in value (US Dollars x 1000) 
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Source: FAO 
The high demand of this species in Spain has pushed the imports of Hake in the last ten years. 
Even if these imports are not from the same species it has had a great impact on the first 
selling prices of Hake, reducing the performance of the Spanish fleets and also reducing the 
dependence of the local communities to this species. In fact, locally, airports are the main 
entrance of Hake in many regions of Spain. 
8.3 UK 
It is unlikely that the Hake long term management plan will have much total impact on 
employment either in the fleet or on-shore. Being ninth in importance, an improved stock is 
simply likely to contribute to a higher crew share. Little value is added to Hake as it is mostly 
sent with minimal processing to Spain. Hence there will be little effect on processors or 
employment in processing. Even in Lochinver and Newlyn, the impact on employment will be 
minimal. 
  76
8.4 Ireland 
Hake is not a favourite among Irish consumers and most is transported to Spain with minimal 
processing. It is unlikely that the Hake long term management plan will have any significant 
effect on employment off-shore or onshore.  
 
 
  
 
9 BIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE LONG TERM PLAN AND CURRENT MANAGEMENT  
9.1 Long term catch and SSB as a function of fishing mortality under equilibrium 
conditions. 
The study group calculated the long term landings and SSB under several hypothesis on 
recruitment using a long term yield model (Thompson and Bell, 1934). 
Input parameters are from the ICES averages 2004-2006 for maturity at age, natural mortality, 
F at age, mean weight at age in the stock and in the catch. S/R relationship have been 
estimated using historical series of SSB and recruitment. 
Figure 9.1.1: Equilibrium yield and SSB estimated under various S/R relationship and in the base-case (without 
discards) 
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Figure 9.1.2: Equilibrium yield and SSB estimated under various S/R relationship with discards 
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Figures 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 show the development of equilibrium landings or catch and SSB with 
increasing exploitation rates for various hypothesis on S/R relationship and using data from 
assessments with and without discards. 
Table 9.1.1: Model results 
 Without 
discards 
  With 
discards 
  
 Ricker Ockham Beverton Ricker Ockham Beverton 
MSY (t) 69288 62114 74475 73629 64764 87965
Fmsy 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.09
mF 0.82 0.70 0.55 0.65 0.48 0.40
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If an Ockam S/R relationship is used, in comparison with the unchanged fishing scenario, the 
application of the management plan indicates a long term relative increases of Hake landings 
by 3% as compared to the equilibrium catch and by 44% as compared with the current 
landings. This would mean a 30% reduction in F from 0.25 to 0.17. 
When discards are included, the application of the management plan would lead to a 20% 
increase in yield as compare to the unchanged fishing scenario and a 57% as compared to the 
current situation. This would mean a 52% reduction in F from 0.25 to 0.12 
9.2 Medium term implications  
During the June meeting in Lisbon, SGBRE-07-03 conducted a series of medium term 
simulations. The main results have already been presented above (see chapter 4). For detailed 
information we refer to SGBRE-07-03 report. 
 
  
 
10 UNCERTAINTY AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
10.1 Uncertainty in Biological Simulation  
The algorithm used to simulate the scenarios in the Lisbon meeting is a Management Strategy 
Evaluation (MSE) algorithm which simulates the real biological population, the fishery and 
the management process of Northern stock of Hake. The population and the fishery are 
simulated in the so called operating model and the management process is mimicked by 
means of the observation model, the assessment model (XSA), a Harvest Control Rule and the 
implementation model. The links between the operating model and management procedure 
are the observation model, which samples the population, and the implementation model, 
which put into practice the management advice obtained when applying the HCR.  
Only two sources of biological uncertainty were introduced into the model; the initial 
population and the recruitment variability. The initial population was obtained through 
bootstrapping the XSA for 100 iterations, adding a lognormal random error to the abundance 
indices in each iteration. In the projection the recruitment was obtained using the stock 
recruitment relationship and a multiplicative lognormal random error. 
In the observation model a lognormal error was introduced in the observed indices and the 
catch-at-age matrix was sampled without error. The catch at age matrix and the abundance 
indices observed were then used by the XSA to estimate an observed population, which, in 
principle, should not correspond with the real one. This discrepancy between the real and 
observed populations was a source of uncertainty, which made the real fishing mortality 
performed by the fishery different to the Ftarget chosen for advice.  
10.2 Robustness of the Impact assessment  
The EIAA model simulates the progress of the finances of the fleet segments selected in 
response to exogenous annual changes in the aggregate stock size. The model was originally 
built in order to predict the immediate impact on fleet segments of TAC levels proposed. This 
and other considerations need to be borne in mind in reading the results obtained from the 
model. 
The Time Horizon 
The rank of scenarios has been found to be dependent on the length of the time period 
considered. A time horizon of 10 years is normally enough for stocks to recover to a steady 
state level. However, the model shows that in the case of Hake the steady state of the yields in 
the Fpa and status quo scenarios converge at a long term level that is around 2,000 tonnes 
lower (59,000 tonnes against 61,000 tonnes) than the cases where the fishing mortality rate is 
reduced. To take that into account, calculations have been made where the net profit in the last 
year of the projection period (for France 2016 and for Spain 2014) has been used as input for 
the subsequent years.  
The two best scenarios in the projections period 2007-2016 respectively have been compared 
(2005-2014 for Spain owing to a lack of two years’ data) and the net present value for longer 
periods has been computed. The best option for this period is the Fpa scenario.  
The result is that if the period considered is prolonged from 2007 to 2023 for the French case 
and 2005 to 2021 for the Spanish case the two scenarios (Fpa and the 15% reduction to Fmax) 
are of equal benefit. For longer time periods, the 15% reduction to Fmax is then the best. The 
results for the Fpa and the 15% reduction to Fmax scenarios are presented in table 10.2.1 for 
two fleet segments. Other scenarios have been computed and in general the same result 
appears. 
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Table 10.2.1: Comparison of two scenarios for different time periods by use of net present value of net profit at a 
5% interest rate, m€. 
 
France  Netters 12-24m  
Fmax   
Time period - 2007 to  2023 2031 2046 
Fpa 2016; net profit 36.7    
15% reduction 2016; net profit 37.6    
Difference -0.9    
NPV for additional years  3 6 9  
NPV 2008-2016 Fpa 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.2 
NPV 2008-2016 15% red. 79.8 83.0 85.6 88.4 
     
Spain Longlines 24-40m 
 Fmax  
Time period - 2005 to  2021 2029 2044 
Fpa 2014; net profit 18.8    
15% reduction 2014; net profit 21.0    
Difference -2.2    
NPV for additional years  8 15 22  
NPV 2006-2014 Fpa 116.3 116.3 116.3 116.3 
NPV 2006-2014 15% red. 105.2 113.6 120.2 127.4 
Some conclusions with respect to robustness in terms of time periods can now de drawn. 
From a very short term perspective (i.e. up to 3 years) the most attractive solution seems to be 
to apply Fpa fishing mortality rates or even higher mortality rates. The reason for this being a 
possible increases in landings and a short term limited negative effects on the stock biomass. 
From a medium term perspective of up to ten years the best approach is to use the Fpa fishing 
mortality continued as hitherto. In the very long run i.e. around 20 years or more the prefered 
scenario is reduction in the fishing mortality rate of 15% per year until the Fmax or the 120% of 
the Fmax (of almost equal importance) is reached. Reducing the fishing mortality rate to 80% 
of the Fmax is not a preferred solution. 
 
The Effect on Quayside Prices 
The European market is likely to be integrated, with the Law of One Price (allowing for 
transport costs) holding. Thus, similar induced changes in the quayside price will be 
experienced in all the countries fishing Northern Hake. It does not follow that an increase in 
landings will automatically mean an increase in sales revenue or profits since changes in 
landings may induce an inverse response in prices. The relative magnitude of these changes 
will determine the effect on total revenue. No studies exist where the price elasticity of 
  
demand for Hake has been estimated but demersal species throughout Europe enjoy elastic 
responsiveness of demand to changes in price. If Hake adheres to this pattern, the implication 
is that large increases in landings will cause only relatively small falls in price and that the 
total revenues of the fleets increase as landings rise. 
On-Shore Effects 
The remaining consideration is that the magnitude of the on-shore effects is not examined in 
detail. Qualitatively, it is possible to conclude that the impacts on the fleets will be magnified 
on shore by the multiplier process. The Hake market in Spain prefers a product with little 
value-added on-shore and so the multiplier effects might be expected to have a value lower 
than those associated with demand- and supply-driven output and employment multipliers in 
other fisheries. 
10.3 Reflections on the propensity of the Socio-Economic Analysis 
The EIAA model simulates the progress of the finances of the fleet segments selected in 
response to exogenous annual changes in the aggregate stock size.  The model was originally 
built in order to predict the immediate impact on fleet segments of TAC levels proposed two 
years ahead. The model used has been extended to run over a period of ten years. Making 
projections for such a long time comprises a number of difficulties and uncertainties. 
First, the ceteris paribus assumption enables the impact of proposed measures to be separated 
from other changes that may occur in a fishery but as time progresses such an assumption 
becomes progressively less acceptable in that the changing condition of the fishery will 
inevitably affect the level of capital invested and the amount of fishing. The Northern Hake 
fishery may be considered an open access fishery because at least some of the fleets 
participating in the fishery enjoy fishing without a clear proprietary right in quota which 
would create a market in it. While the model itself is immune from the difficulties of quota 
enforcement the problems existing will determine whether the results predicted by the model 
materialise. A successful programme to re-build the stock may be accompanied by capital 
stuffing induced by the associated improving profitability of fishing which in the longer term 
will result in such profits (which include the resource rent) being dissipated. In the long run, 
the fishery might be expected to show a re-emergence of problems of overfishing and 
overcapacity accompanied by a failure to provide for depreciation but the possibility of entry 
or exit of vessels to the fishery is excluded. The question of entry/exit may have important 
consequences for the modelling exercise. 
The impact on other catches of the fleet segments has not been displayed because the 
relationship between each species as a target is not known. It is conceivable that a healthy 
Hake stock would reduce pressure on other stocks by changing the relative catches per unit of 
effort. Alternatively, should the fishery invite more fishing through increased profitability 
there may be an adverse effect on complementary stocks. These effects may exhibit inter-
temporal variation. Their net impact is therefore indeterminate and has been omitted from the 
analysis. 
The approach using fleet segments is of mixed virtue but has been dictated by the use of the 
EIAA model which is the only model with any track record in ex ante socio-economic 
analysis of proposed management measures. The benefit of this is that concentration is 
focussed on those fleet segments to which the Northern Hake is most important. No overall 
assessment for the fishery as a single unit has been possible because the basic data is not 
available.  
However, it is possible to make a qualitative assessment of the overall impact and this can 
offer important insights for managing the fishery. Although the economic condition of the 
fishery does not indicate a notable decline, there is clear biological evidence of over-fishing 
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which is reducing the average age of the stock. This is also evidence of economic 
overcapacity.  
A key economic characteristic of the fishery is that the rights to quota are not sufficiently 
clear for a secondary market to have developed to enable quota to be exchanged between 
fishing enterprises. In order to control the economic incentives to overinvest and overfish, 
therefore, measures which address this problem are needed. The right to clarify the quota 
rights lies with the member states which possess the quotas.  
Constrained changes in TACs will not in themselves produce the benefits of future larger 
stocks. Rather, any short term benefit risks being eroded as improved profitability encourages 
increased investment when just the opposite is needed. Attempts to control overfishing by 
reducing the number of days at sea available to vessels could also ultimately be fruitless 
because increased profitability will encourage substitution of factors of production in an event 
known to fishery economics as capital-stuffing. This does not deny that there could be short 
term benefits for the stock but in the long run it frustrates attempts to reduce the inputs to 
fishing such as machinery controls, days limitations and closed seasons. Worse, it leads to 
profitability being lost through excessive investment by the fleets in a vain attempt to obtain 
even more profits in the presence of a congestion externality. The externality means that 
increased activity by one reduces the average earnings of all (including the initiator). 
The economic results might be expected to show little or no improvement in the returns from 
the resource rent to society. However, the benefits in increased security for the economic 
activity founded on Northern Hake arising from a larger stock, if one emerges, must not be 
overlooked.  
  
 
11 EFFECTS ON EXPLOITATION PATERNS AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONG 
TERM MANAGEMENT PLAN 
Decreases in Fishing Mortality 
If it is only a decrease in overall F (i.e., on all ages) as was requested in the ToR of the 
SGBRE-07-3 Lisbon meeting, then there is no direct change in the selection pattern per se. 
However, indirect change in selection pattern could be expected as a consequence of changes 
in the fleet structure, each fleet segment having different selection patterns. The current 
economic simulations do not consider effects of changes in the fleet structure. It is thus not 
possible for the Group to quantify how such changes may impact the overall selection pattern. 
It should be noted that, with the currently available models with an additional effort it is  
possible to incorporate any restructuring of the fleet in the analysis, however this would 
require a wider data set and additional time available for the analysis. 
Changes in Gear Selectivity 
If the management plan includes explicit measures to improve the selection pattern, as was 
tested in the simulations including discards, two points can be made: 
First, it should be kept in mind that the simulated improvement of the selection pattern tested 
by the Group cannot easily be linked to any existing devices or practices. However, this shows 
the way management of the fishery should aim, given in mind that an improvement of the 
exploitation pattern can be achieved not only by an increase in the mesh-size. A similar result 
can be obtained by selection devices in existing gear (like square mesh panels in trawls), by 
using different kinds of gear or by changing fishing areas or periods to avoid those for which 
there is a high proportion of small fish in the catch. 
Secondly, the simulations showed that improving the exploitation pattern could lead to better 
long-term yields while the reduction in overall effort would be smaller. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that given the current state of the stock, the changes in the exploitation pattern 
postulated would not lead to absolute losses of catch in the short term. The Group is well 
aware that such results remain very theoretical. Nevertheless, it is considered that this is an 
important issue to be considered in any long term management plan: the more the exploitation 
pattern is improved, the greater would be the yield and the less the necessary reduction in 
overall effort, as shown by the figure 12.1 below: 
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Figure 12.1 Yield per recruit values for various combinations of overall F multiplier and selection patterns. The 
red points show what would be Fmax for given selection pattern. 
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Economic Considerations Regarding Alternative Exploitation Patterns 
These scientific results remain problematic in economic terms. An improved exploitation 
pattern in what is, according to economics, an open access fishery will mean a larger stock of 
larger fish. For any given volume of landings (TAC), this would mean a higher total sales 
revenue from the fishery. It would also mean an improved catch per unit of fishing activity 
implying lower costs. However, open access causes increased profitability quickly to be 
dissipated. The result would be capital stuffing raising costs to a level which reduced 
economic profits to zero. The benefits of a more secure fishery should not be understated, but 
clearly, whether benefits accruing to the stock can be translated into benefits for the fleets 
depends on the management systems in each member state for TACs and quota and not on the 
existence of TACs and quotas themselves. 
Additional Effort Regulations 
Finally, the management plan could include effort regulations on specific fleet segments or on 
specific métiers. As the group did not investigate such plans, it is not possible to draw more 
than very general conclusions regarding this issue. As the different métiers have not the same 
selection patterns, a management plan leading to changes in the fleet structure is likely to 
result in change in the overall selection pattern. As mentioned above, current models do not 
allow for the inclusion of fleet or métier restructuring. 
  
Feedback Effects: Entry and Exit 
The question of entry/exit may have important consequences for the modelling exercise. 
Trying to estimate the effect of modifying selection patterns in order to investigate different 
scenarios more detailed than a variation in total F, in order to simulate how changes in 
financial profits will affect the selection patterns in the future it is necessary to build a model 
with endogenous entry and exit.  
Feedback Effects: Gear Selectivity 
However, it is possible to calculate the effect of redistributing the fishing mortality among 
gears on the selection patterns. In particular, we are interested in simulating the effect of the 
introduction of changes in the trawl technology in order to reduce the impact of the trawl 
gears on Hake juveniles.  
Table 12.1: Partition of landings-at-age by gear 
Gear Age 0 Age 1 Age 2 Age 3 Age 4 Age 5 Age 6 Age 7 Age 8+ 
Trawl 0.9990 0.9790 0.9232 0.8535 0.7028 0.4510 0.2856 0.2050 0.1215 
Gill. 0.0000 0.0108 0.0491 0.0727 0.0854 0.1666 0.2795 0.3490 0.4211 
Long. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0083 0.0763 0.2314 0.2812 0.2914 0.2884 
Others 0.0010 0.0102 0.0274 0.0655 0.1356 0.1510 0.1537 0.1546 0.1690 
Source: Report SGBRE-07-03 
To explore the effects of a more selective policy, first we built a simple model for a multi fleet 
fishery. Second, the model was calibrated in order to reproduce the partition of landings-at-
age by gear provided in table 12.1. Finally, the calibrated model was used to calculate catches 
and spawning stock biomass for the different selection patterns, by gear, induced by changes 
in quotas. figure 12.1 shows, given the initial conditions of the stock. 
The optimal trajectory associated with a policy which changes the implicit gear quotas (which 
are assumed proportionately constant) to allow a more selective exploitation of the resource 
(Improved Gear Selectivity),  
- the optimal trajectory proposed keeps the quotas constant, and  
- the effect of continuing to fish at current mortality rates (“no policy change"). 
The last of these is related to an improved gear selectivity policy associated with the selective 
scheme which reaches the higher MSY. The main finding is that a redistribution of quotas 
from trawls to the rest of the fleet generates a higher Fmsy, more stable biomass and higher 
catch compared to fishing with the actual selection patterns. Both results are related to the 
changes that more selective gear will induce on the age distribution of the stock. Increasing 
the quotas of more selective gears raises the number of spawners and the average weight of 
the individual fish in the landings increases. In the long run, higher SSB and Yield are 
compatible with the present levels of fishing effort.  
These benefits will not be enjoyed unless a Pareto solution to the problem of ownership of 
fishing entitlements is instituted. From the technical point of view, this solution could be 
implemented through a system of individual transferable quota (ITQ) or some similar system 
which captures the resource rent. If the quota is transferable and divisible, each holder could 
sell or lease part or all. Allowing the less selective fleets to sell their quota and receive the 
discounted future profit from its use by a more selective fleet should lead to higher landings 
and a financially secure fleet enjoying increased profits. Moreover, as the use of more 
selective gear usually also implies the use of a technology more intensive in labour and less 
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dependent on fuel consumption, it is possible that a redistribution of quotas between gears will 
increase employment, reduce consumption and improve the fleets’ carbon footprint. 
Figure 12.2: Change in selection patterns, red (solid) line; Variation in total F, blue (dashed) line 
 
Feedback Effects: The Effects on Size 
A further consideration relates to the impact of the proposed measures, which are essentially 
biological rather than economic, on the size of individual fish in the fishable stock. Changing 
the age structure of the stock by using, for example, larger mesh sizes may result in a larger 
stock of older fish, especially of spawners. However, the market for Hake is primarily driven 
by demand in Spain, to where most of the landings in Europe are sent. The Spanish consumer 
is sometimes said to prefer the flavour of smaller fish but it is not easy to observe differences 
in demand according to size. The smaller fish are more normally caught by trawlers. The 
quality of larger fish provided by netters and hookers is better, so any premiums for quality 
may be counter-balanced by a discount for size. In addition, the different fleets operate 
different sales methods, some sending their catches through the auction while others sell by 
contract locally and others yet again trans-ship directly to Spain. In general, it is not thought 
likely that a change in the age and size structure of the stock will have a socio-economic 
impact. 
MSY 
MSY is in part dependent on the fishing method employed because a reduction in discards or 
other losses of small fish might have an impact on the number of fish surviving to sexual 
maturity and might also therefore have an impact on the size of the fishable stock. This could 
lead to an increase in landings per unit of fishing activity. 
  
 
12 FUTURE NEEDS OF DATA, IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING 
With respect to the economic information, the EU member states collect economic data within 
lines specified in the Data Collection Regulation (DCR)2. Collection of data is on a yearly 
basis for the specified fleets within the regulation. It covers information on 1) income, 2) 
variable costs related to crew, fuel, repair and maintenance and other operational costs, 3) 
fixed costs, 4) investments, 5) prices per species, 6) employment and 7) fleet characteristics in 
form of tonnage, engine power, age and gear used.  
Nevertheless the segmentation that DCR proposes does not distribute costs parameters among 
seas. It has implication in the economical assessment of the Northern Hake. For example in 
the segment covering trawlers 24-40 m in Spain, vessels from the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean are mixed, which results in data collected under the DCR to be used carefully, 
given that the Mediterranean and the Atlantic are two different fishing realities, in terms of 
costs. In this report none of the data provided under the DCR have been used for the Spanish 
fleets due to this definition dilemma. 
Going into more detail about the more specific data requirements, a distinction can be made 
between two types of analysis. 
1) Simple projections of stock biomass and landings based on simulated stock dynamics using 
parameters estimated by the current stock assessment procedure. The results on landings and 
F would then be used to calculate revenue and costs.  
2) An integrated approach where the determination of catches takes into account the 
behaviour of fishermen. The determined catches then feed into the biological part of the bio 
economic model, which then calculates the stocks for the forthcoming period. Sources of 
discrepancies between those catches predicted by the biological part and the “real” ones have, 
at least the following sources: 
1. The use of a production function more close to the economical rationality. 
2. Effort should be driven by any of the species involved in the fisheries; in fact a 
management alternative could evoke a shift as to the main species driving the effort 
(change in métier). 
3. Effort regulations. 
4. Effort of enforcement and compliance. 
5. Over or under catches in relationship to the TAC/quota implemented. 
6. Capital investment decisions taken by the firms. 
The applied EIAA model is taking item 1 and 2 into account and implicitly item 5 and 6, 
although these results are not used. Effort of enforcement and compliance cost are not 
included but could be if the data is available 
This integrated approach could result in an impact assessment of a management measure 
showing both biological an socio-economic reality in light of reaching the target desired (i.e., 
FMSY). It could be the case that some of the alternatives with desirable biological results (in 
terms of time for obtaining the target and the risk of the alternative) are simply unachievable 
when the economic rationality is included in the analysis. It opens the chance to find 
management alternatives designed to reach economic and biological targets simultaneously 
while being more robust to the (chance of) behaviour of vessels and/or firms.  
                                                     
2 See for instance Council Regulation (EC) No 1543/2000. 
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To improve the economic part of the impact assessment of recovery plans a comprehensive 
bio-economic model founded firmly in sound economic theory is needed. This should have as 
its objective the maximisation of benefits to society and employ constraints for demand, 
production, and the stock. This is partly done in the EIAA model. In the EFIMAS project 
work is underway to expand in that area. 
In order to build this, there is a distinct need for consistent time series of data of revenues and 
quantity of landings by species by country by fleet. In addition there is a need for time series 
of data on the factors of production – quantities used and opportunity cost – labour, capital, 
days at sea, kW, kW-days, licence prices, all by country by fleet, and quota prices by country 
by species. In addition there is a need for time series data on stocks at the aggregate level by 
stock by species. 
Current impact assessments do not account for differences in selection pattern between métier. 
So there is a need to carry out simulations by fleet/métier. For this the appropriate model 
needs to be devised.  
Concerning the data needs of an impact assessment, especially when the analysis covers 
several countries, fleets and métiers, there is a need for a proper definition of the métiers and 
data on effort also required by segment. In addition data on a spatial scale are required, 
especially when selectivity differs between areas.  
Concerning data for monitoring management measures, time series of fishing effort and 
fishery landings and discards for appropriate fleet units, available at the spatial and temporal 
resolution are required.  
Adequate assessment of discarding is required in order to get better information on the 
changes in selectivity. Valuable information to serve this purpose could be derived from 
discard sampling programmes carried out in close collaboration with the fishing industry. 
Improve survey information is also required 
Knowledge of fishermen’s tactical decisions in response to the management measures is 
required. Especially long term individual behaviour, such as the choice for entry/exit, fishing 
strategy and capital investment choices are of prime importance for the long run analysis.  
  
 
13 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given that fishing is an economic activity, the question to be asked is what economic 
institutions are to be used to produce the stock recovery? Under the management plan the 
institutions to be used are quota constraints and days limitations. Neither of these has an 
economic component in the plan though whether they do in practice varies by member state 
and fleet. They are both merely legal except in those fleets operating under ITQs, where there 
is an economic component.  
The stock recovery predicted by the biological model will be achieved only if Member State 
governments set in place the necessary economic institutions and ensure that the quota rights 
are clarified. Otherwise the short-term gains promoted by the scientific measures are unlikely 
to be sustained. Effort controls are of only short run effectiveness because of the ability of the 
fleet to circumvent them by increased investments in more efficient vessels and gear, known 
as capital stuffing. 
In order to implement a true socio-economic impact assessment not only focussing on the 
fleets but also the processing and ancillary industry, data on these should be available. 
Taking a restructuring of the fleet through entry-exit strategies, change of métier and/or 
change of fishing and selection pattern, into account is important to predict the impact of any 
set of management measures. The time available for the current analysis has not allowed for 
the implementation of this analysis in full detail. 
As mentioned in the report, for Spain the data set currently available under the DCR has fleet 
definition problems. As a result DCR data do not present a true picture of Hake fleets. 
Consequently the years over which the base data were available did differ for the countries 
included in the analysis. Although on a country by country basis this does not pose a large 
problem, as long as scenario’s are analysed country by country, comparison of the results of 
the analysis between countries becomes difficult as the time periods differ. 
In addition, although in general the  DCR does cater for economic data, current DCR 
segmentation does not allow linking specific fleets, métiers and species to landings and effort.  
It is recommended to, in the future to have the analysis be focused more on fleets and fleet 
segments than on the impact of specific management measures for specific countries.  
Having the opportunity to produce a draft version of the current report prior to the final 
working group meeting by allocating working days to the experts is highly appreciated. The 
time allocated has allowed for a proper preparation of the draft report, which greatly improved 
the efficiency of the final meeting. 
However, it is observed that the process would gain efficiency and effectivity if the process 
could start off with a kick off meeting in which the main structure of the report is agreed upon 
and tasks are shared between the experts. Using correspondence is not the most effective way 
of communication at the start of this process. The process of this particular working group 
gained momentum at the moment three of the members were able to, in the margin of another 
meeting, take decisions on issues that were being discussed between the experts. 
Further, the Impact Assessment currently is a stand alone exercise after the biological analysis 
has been implemented. As the general strive is to arrive at a single integrated analysis, for 
which yet the appropriate instruments need be developed, it is recommended in future to have 
the biological assessment and the socio-economic Impact Assessment be implemented 
simultaneously.  
A further integration with wider socio-economic consequences and taking on board in the 
analysis changes in fleet composition and consequent changes in fishing behaviour is 
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recommended. Integration of analytical models and the development of appropriate models is 
in this a requirement. 
  
 
14 REFERENCES 
Piñeiro, C. and M. Saínza. 2003. “Age estimation, growth and maturity of the European Hake 
(Merluccius merluccius (Linnaeus, 1758)) form Iberian Atlantic waters,” ICES Journal of 
Marine Science, 60, 1086-1112. 
Puntual, Hélène de; Anne Laure Groison; Carmen Piñeiro and Michel Bertignac. 2006. 
“Evidence of underestimation of European Hake growth in the Bay of Biscay, and its 
relationship with bias in the agreed method of age estimation,” ICES Journal of Marine 
Science, 63, 1674-1681. 
  92
 
15 APPENDIX I WORK GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
 
STECF Members:  
Luc van Hoof    Chair; Economist, member STECF 
Raul Prellezo   Economist / Modelling, member STECF 
Fabienne Daures  Economist / Modelling, member STECF 
 
Invited Experts: 
Hans Frost   Economist / Modelling 
Dolores Garza Gil  Economist  
Cristina Calvo Santos  Economist  
Michel Bertignac  Biologist 
Jose Maria da Rocha  Economist / Modelling 
Dorleta Garcia  Modelling 
Philip Rodgers  Economist  
 
JRC Experts: 
Franz Hoelker  Modelling 
 
European Commission: 
Angel Calvo (DG FISH) 
Claudio Collova (DG FISH) 
Lisa Borges (DG FISH) 
Franz Hoelker (JRC, STECF Secretariat) 
 
The valuable input of Sebastien Demaneche of IFREMER in processing the French data is 
kindly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
16 APPENDIX II COMPARISON OF SCENARIOS  
 
Table II.1 Comparison of two scenarios for different time periods by use of net present value of net profit at a 
5% interest rate, m€. 
 
France  Netters 12-24m  
Fmax   
Time period - 2007 to  2023 2031 2046 
Fpa 2016; net profit 36.7    
15% reduction 2016; net profit 37.6    
Difference -0.9    
NPV for additional years  3 6 9  
NPV 2008-2016 Fpa 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.2 
NPV 2008-2016 15% red. 79.8 83.0 85.6 88.4 
08Fmax     
Time period - 2007 to  2023 2031 2046 
Fpa 2016; net profit 36.7    
15% reduction 2016; net profit 37.1    
Difference -0.4    
NPV for additional years  1 3 4  
NPV 2008-2016 Fpa 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.2 
NPV 2008-2016 15% red. 75.7 77.1 78.2 79.4 
12Fmax     
Time period - 2007 to  2023 2031 2046 
Fpa 2016; net profit 36.7    
15% reduction 2016; net profit 37.4    
Difference -0.7    
NPV for additional years  3 4 7  
NPV 2008-2016 Fpa 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.2 
NPV 2008-2016 15% red. 82.5 85.0 87.0 89.1 
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Spain Longlines 24-40m 
 Fmax  
Time period - 2005 to  2021 2029 2044 
Fpa 2014; net profit 18.8    
15% reduction 2014; net profit 21.0    
Difference -2.2    
NPV for additional years  8 15 22  
NPV 2006-2014 Fpa 116.3 116.3 116.3 116.3 
NPV 2006-2014 15% red. 105.2 113.6 120.2 127.4 
08Fmax  
Time period - 2005 to  2021 2029 2044 
Fpa 2014; net profit 18.8    
15% reduction 2014; net profit 19.5    
Difference -0.7    
NPV for additional years  3 5 7  
NPV 2006-2014 Fpa 116.3 116.3 116.3 116.3 
NPV 2006-2014 15% red. 95.4 98.1 100.3 102.7 
12Fmax  
Net present value of net profits for different time periods   
Time period - 2005 to  2021 2029 2044 
Fpa 2014; net profit 18.8    
15% reduction 2014; net profit 20.7    
Difference -1.9    
NPV for additional years  7 13 19  
NPV 2006-2014 Fpa 116.3 116.3 116.3 116.3 
NPV 2006-2014 15% red. 112.2 119.3 124.9 131.0 
 
 
  
 
17 APPENDIX III OUTLINE OF THE EIAA MODEL 
Extract from SEC(2004) 1710. 
1.  EIAA model equations 
The EIAA model computes future landings value and costs by use of recorded baseline 
information, which is a three years average, and future TACs as proposed by the EU 
Commission, ICES et. al. 
 
1.1. Landings of quota species in future periods: 
The landing of quota species in future periods per fleet segment is calculated by taking the 
quota share of the country of the total EU-TAC and distribute that by use of the fleet segments 
share of the national share in the baseline period. The degree to which the quota is exhausted 
is taken into account by use of an up-take-ratio: 
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where nui,m  can be changed and is defined as:  
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L0, i, m, j Member State m landings at base years of species i by fleet segment j  
(exogenous variable) 
Lt, i, j, m Member State m landings at year t of species i by fleet segment j  
(endogenous variable) 
Qt, i, a Quota at year t of species i in area a (exogenous variable) 
nsi, a, m Relative stability i.e. Member State m share of species i in area a (parameter) 
nui, m Member State m quota uptake ratio of species i (parameter, calculated by the 
model). Can be changed for future years 
Q0, i, a, m  Member State m quota in base years of species i (exogenous variable) 
 
The following is described on Member State level. Therefore m is omitted. 
 
1.2. Prices in future periods 
After the calculations of future landings prices are calculated. First the baseline prices are 
calculated from the landings value and the landings volume. Then, assuming that the price of 
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each species in the future is a function of the total EU-TACs, future prices are calculated. The 
function includes a price flexibility rate which is fixed at –0.2 as a default rate: 
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αi ≤ 0 
 
P0 , i, j Fish prices in base years of species i by fleet segment j (endogenous variable) 
L0, i, j  Landings of quota species i in base years by fleet segment j (exogenous variable) 
TR0, i, j total revenue of quota species in base years of species i by fleet segment j 
(exogenous variable) 
Pt, i, j Fish prices year t of species i by fleet segment j (endogenous variable) 
αi Price flexibility of quota species i. Can be changed 
 
1.3. Gross revenue in future periods 
Gross revenue (total revenue) in future periods is calculated by the computed landings and 
prices for the future period. The value of non-quota species are calculated from baseline 
information and added to the computed future value of quota species. Finally the computed 
gross revenue for the future period is adjusted with a coefficient to account for income outside 
fisheries etc.:  
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where Kt, j is defined as: 
3.2 ∑ ⋅−=
i
jijijjt LPTRK ,,0,,0,0,  
and GR0, j is defined as: 
3.3 jjj OTRGR ,0,0,0 +=  
TRt, j Total revenue at year t by segment j 
Kt, j Landings value at year t of other species than quota species of segment j 
  
GR0, j Gross revenue including non-fisheries specific income of segment j 
O0, j Income from non-fisheries specific activities of fleet segment j 
 
1.4. Variable costs in future periods 
A fleet activity variable A is calculated and used in the model to adjust variable costs. 
Changes are considered only within fleet segments, not between segments. The calculation of 
the fleet activity variable consists of three steps. The rationale behind this procedure is the 
(well known) Cobb-Douglas type production function where an explicit functional form a 
fleet segment and a single species is: 
4.1 A = β
χ
SSB
LTLpa )(*   
where 
A: fleet activity 
a: coefficient 
p: price as a function of aggregate landings TL on EU level 
L: landings per segment 
SSB: spawning stock biomass 
chi and beta are parameters (flexibilities) 
Expanding this expression in terms of time, species and fleet segment one gets the expression 
that is applied in the model: 
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χ ≥ 0; and β ≥ 0 
 
4.3 jt,ARCRC jjt, ⋅= ,0   function of quota species only, or 
4.4 jt,AARCRC jjt, ⋅= ,0   function of all species 
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At, j ‘Activity coefficient’ as a function of quota species at year t of fleet segment j; A0, 
j = 1 (endogenous variable) calculated for the baseline 
Lt ,i, j Landings in volume in baseline period 0, and TAC in period t of species i by fleet 
segment j 
Pt ,i, j Prices in period t of species i by fleet segment j 
SSBt, i  Spawning stock biomass at year t of species i (exogenous variable) 
AAt, j ‘Activity coefficient’ as a function of quota and non quota species at year t of fleet 
segment j; (endogenous variable) 
χi, j ‘Technology flexibility rate’ of quota species i by fleet segment j 
βi ‘Stock – effort’ flexibility rate of quota species i 
RCt, j  Running costs at year t of fleet segment j, includes fuel and other fishing days 
dependent costs (endogenous variable) 
RC0, j  Running costs at base years of fleet segment j, includes fuel and other fishing days 
dependent costs (exogenous variable) 
The ‘P-element’ account for incentives to reallocate effort as a function of changes in relative 
prices. Note that future prices depend on the price flexibility rates, see equation 2.1 and 2.2. 
The ‘L-element’ accounts for technological accessibility. If χ is zero the fish is easily 
accessible, and when χ increases if accessibility becomes harder. The default value in the 
model is χ = 1. The inclusion of the element makes it possible to distinguish between different 
accessibilities in particular for demersal and pelagic species and different fishing 
technologies.  
The SSB-element accounts for accessibility caused by stock abundance. β = 0 implies there is 
no stock abundance effect on activity.  With full effect β = 1. Default values are between 0.6 
and 0.8 for demersal species and between 0.1 and 0.2 for pelagic species 
When the A-variable is calculated for each fleet segment the recorded variable costs RC0,j for 
the baseline period is multiplied with A to obtain variable cost for the future period. A 
numerical example in appendix table III.1 shows the calculation of At in the lower right hand 
cell. 
The model contain to options for calculating A. One option takes into account only the effect 
of changes in the quota species. The second options denoted AA is adjusted for the share of 
the value of the quota species relative to the total landings value. 
By use of that procedure it is assumed that each species in the landings composition could be 
caught separately which makes it possible to add the cost share oh each species. However in 
many fisheries joint production prevails entailing that species are caught in fixed proportions. 
These fixed proportions are however changed in future periods by change of the quota 
compositions.   
Further to the variable costs the crew share is calculated in the model for the baseline period 
by taking the costs of the crew relative to the gross revenue. 
4.6 jtjjt TRccCC ,,0, =  
where cc0, j is defined as: 
4.7 
j
j
j GR
CS
cc
,0
,0
,0 ⋅=  
  
CCt, j Crew share at year t of fleet segment j (endogenous variable) 
CC0, j Crew share coefficient in base years of fleet segment j (endogenous variable) 
CS0, j Crew share in base years of fleet segment j (exogenous variable) 
 
1.5. Fixed costs 
Fixed costs are assumed constant i.e. transferred from the baseline period to the future period. 
The model distinguish between fixed costs related to the operation of the vessel and fixed 
capital costs 
5.1 jjt FCFC ,0, =  
5.2 jjt DCDC ,0, =  
FCj Fixed costs, fleet segment j, other than DC and RC 
DCj  Depreciation and interest costs, fleet segment j  
 
1.6. Indicators of economic performance: 
A number of economic indicators are calculated as shown by the subsequent expressions. 
 
Cash Flow: 
 
6.1 )( ,,,,, jtjtjtjtjt FCCCRCTRGF +−= +  
 
Net profit: 
 
6.2 
)( ,,,,,, jtjtjtjtjtjt DCFCCCRCTRNP ++−= +  
 
Operating profit margin: 
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Gross value added: 
6.4 jtjtjtjt
DCCCNPGV  ,,,, ++=  
GFt, j Gross cash flow at year t of fleet segment j 
NPt, j Net profit at year t of fleet segment j 
OPMt, j Operating profit margin at year t of fleet segment j 
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1.7. Break even and ‘over capacity’ 
The EIAA model contains information that makes it possible to calculate the gross revenue 
that is required to cover fixed costs exactly with the given variable costs. That is denoted the 
Break-even revenue. With salary to the owner/skipper of the vessel included in the variable 
cost the Break-even revenue is the revenue that equals net profit at zero. 
Break-even Revenue =  (Depreciation + Interest) * Revenue / (Revenue  - (Fuel C. + Running 
Costs + Vessels Costs + Crew Share)) or BeR = Fixed costs * Revenue / Gross Cash Flow if 
vessels costs are included in fixed costs. 
If Break-even revenue and the actual revenue is compared an indication of the change of the 
fixed costs in order to comply with break-even is obtained. Assuming that fixed costs are a 
proxy for capacity an indication of over and under capacity is provided. The result does not 
indicate whether a required change in fixed cost actually is possible, only that it is necessary. 
Further it is possible with the information in the model to estimated remuneration of the fish 
stocks i.e. include resource rent. Required resource rent is include in the fixed costs of a fleet 
segment, and the obtained result indicates the level of capacity if the ‘capital’ fish resources is 
remunerated in the same way as the capital invested in fishing vessels. 
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Note: Inclusion of FCt, j is subject to consideration; therefore in bracket 
 
Definition: Over-capacity = 1- Revenue / Break-even Revenue 
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The value share of the fish stocks subject to quotas of each fleet segment and Member State is 
calculated: 
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Break-even with quota fish stock value included (subsequently Member State i.e. m is 
omitted): 
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Calculation of other species excl. quota species are calculated: 
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Note: Inclusion of FCt, j is subject to consideration; therefore in bracket 
 
7.8 
jt
jt
jt BRTS
TR
OCTS
,
,
, 1−=  
 
 
BRt, j Break-even at year t of fleet segment j. It is optional to include FC 
OCt, j Over capacity at year t of fleet segment j 
SSBLCt, i, j  Spawning stock biomass costs of quota species at year t of species i by fleet 
segment j  
rl Remuneration percentage of the quota fish stocks 
BRLSt, j Break-even at year t of fleet segment j including remuneration of quota species 
OCLSt, j Over capacity at year t of fleet segment j taking stock remuneration (resource rent) 
of quota species into account 
rn Remuneration percentage of the non quota fish stocks 
SSBNCt, i, j Stock biomass costs of non quota species at year t of species i by fleet segment j 
BRTSt, j Break-even at year t of fleet segment j including remuneration of quota species 
OCTSt, j Over capacity at year t of fleet segment j taking stock remuneration (resource rent) 
of quota and non quota species into account. 
Fixed costs are divided between fixed operational costs on one-hand and depreciation and 
interest payments on the other. These are maintained constant throughout time.  
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Table III.1: Numerical example of the calculation of fleet activity A 
  Landings and quotas Stock abundance SSB Total 
  Base year Year t Base Year t   Year t 
Species 
Landings/q
uotas Price Revenue Quota 
Price 
flexibility Price Revenue 
‘Price 
effect’
Chi 
(χ) 
‘Volume 
effect' 
Total 
effect SSB SSB 
Beta 
(β) 
‘SSB 
effect’ Total effect
1 50 12.0 600 50 -0.2 12 600 0.308 1 1 0.308 200 200 1 1.000 0.308 
2 40 10.0 400 30 -0.2 10.5 420 0.215 1 0.75 0.162 150 100 1 1.500 0.242 
3 30 5.0 150 45 -0.2 4.5 135 0.069 1 1.5 0.104 100 200 1 0.500 0.052 
4 10 70.0 700 15 -0.2 63 630 0.323 1 1.5 0.485 50 75 1 0.667 0.323 
5 5 20.0 100 7.5 -0.2 18 90 0.046 1 1.5 0.069 50 75 1 0.667 0.046 
Total 135   1950 147.5     1875 0.962     1.12692         0.971 
 
 
The activity variable A for period t is in this example 0.971. 
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18 ANNEX I. EXPERT DECLARATIONS 
 
Declarations of invited experts are published on the STECF web site on 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home together with the final report. 
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